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his study of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
(“TCPA”) was made possible through a cy pres distribution
from a class action in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois under the supervision of Senior
Judge William Hart and Magistrate Judge Morton Denlow which
involved claims under the TCPA. Following the settlement of the
litigation, Judge Hart sought proposals for cy pres distributions
that meet existing legal standards.
The Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies is proud to
have been one of the groups selected for a cy pres distribution.
This is the most recent in a series of cy pres distributions that the
Institute has received since its founding in 1994. These distributions and other sources of funds reported on our web site have allowed the Institute to serve its mission of supporting a consumerfriendly economy through the study of consumer protection and
antitrust law and promoting vigorous enforcement for the benefit
of ordinary consumers.
We thank Judge Hart and counsel for the parties for the
funds and the opportunity to undertake the first comprehensive
study of the TCPA since its passage in 1991. Since that time, the
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TCPA has been amended, interpreted, and applied in literally
thousands of cases. Enacted in an era of fax machines and limited
cell phone usage, the TCPA now must be enforced in an era of
new technology, most notably ubiquitous cell phones, emails, and
fax servers. In this report, we undertake the challenge of analyzing the TCPA’s effectiveness in light of this changing technology
which can both empower consumers, and make them vulnerable
to new and increasingly sophisticated schemes to defraud and invasions of privacy. We propose further changes and amendments
to the statute, its rules, and enforcement to keep the TCPA a relevant and effective means of protecting consumers.
The principal investigator for this report was Daniel B.
Heidtke, a 2012 graduate of Loyola University Chicago School of
Law and a former Student Fellow of the Institute for Consumer
Antitrust Studies, who worked full-time on the research, interviews, and drafting of the report until he entered private practice
in April 2013. The final drafting and editing of the report was
undertaken by Jessica Stewart, also a 2012 graduate of the law
school. All errors remain the responsibility of the Institute.
We would like to thank the following individuals who
generously provided their time for interviews during the research
of the report, reviewed and commented on drafts of the report, or
provided additional research support: Stephen Beard, John C.
Brown, Nicholas Connon, Julie Clark, Jeffery Cross, Daniel
Edelman, Ian Fisher, David Friedman, Justin T. Holcombe, Max
Huffman, David Leibowitz, Max Margulis, James Morsch, Dee
Pridgen, Ali Saeed, Henry A. Turner, and Danny Worker.
This report is one of many projects, programs, and publications of the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies. We invite
you to sample the full work of the Institute on our web site
www.luc.edu/antitrust where you will find a variety of working
papers, white papers, news and views on recent developments,
information on our student and research fellowships, as well as
print, audio, and video of recent Institute programs. We welcome
your comments on this report and all the work of the Institute.
You can reach us at antitrust@luc.edu or on our Facebook page,
https://www.facebook.com/groups/104637465017/.
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47 U.S.C. § 227 (2011).
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In the late 1980s, spurred by advances in technology, the
telemarketing industry began aggressively seeking out consumers
by the hundreds of thousands. Companies began using machines
that automatically dialed consumers and delivered prerecorded
messages (“robocalls”). Marketers also took advantage of another
new and increasingly available piece of technology known as the
facsimile machine (“fax machine”). With the fax machine, marketers could send tens of thousands of unsolicited advertisements
(“junk fax”) each week to consumers across the nation.
Consumers and businesses became overwhelmed with unsolicited telemarketing calls and advertisements. Calls for action
grew louder. States enacted laws, but could not reach the interstate practices of telemarketers. After reviewing and debating ten
different pieces of legislation, Congress enacted the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (“TCPA”).
The primary focus of this report is the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991. The TCPA was born out of abusive
telemarketing practices, made more intrusive by advances in
technology. Originally, the TCPA imposed restrictions on the use
of telephones for unsolicited advertising by telephone and fax. 1
The TCPA has since been expanded and adapted by administrative rule, judicial interpretation, and congressional amendment.
Since 1991, Congress has enacted other statutes relevant to
the discussion of the TCPA. Despite common justifications and
purposes, Congress determined that certain media would be regulated differently. For example, the TCPA originally banned the
practice of sending “junk fax.” The justification for the ban was
that the practice shifted the cost of advertising from the advertiser to the recipient. However, the practice of sending unsolicited
commercial e-mail, which also shifts the cost of advertising from
the advertiser to the recipient, was not banned but instead was
regulated with certain “identification” requirements.
The original purpose of the TCPA was to regulate certain
uses of technology that are abusive, invasive, and potentially
dangerous. The TCPA effectively regulates these abuses by prohibiting certain technologies altogether, rather than focusing specifically on the content of the messages being delivered. The expansion of the TCPA into areas outside of telemarketing and new
technologies over the years is consistent with its original purpose.
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Laura J. Nelson, FTC Hangs Up On Robocalls from ‘Rachel,’ L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 1, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/01/business/la-fi-tnftc-robocalls-credit-card-services-20121101.
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Private parties are largely responsible for the enforcement
of the TCPA, and have done so primarily through the class action
mechanism. While this has drawn some criticism because of the
provision of high statutory damages, the threat of class action has
provided a significant deterrent to violators. Historically the government has only enforced the TCPA to a limited extent, yet the
statute has been relatively successful in reducing the conduct it
was enacted to regulate.
Technology is again rapidly changing and a number of
trends are emerging. The number of entities that are operating in
intentional disregard of the TCPA are growing, and they are using technology to help evade detection and enforcement. According to the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), about 59% of
phone spam cannot be traced or blocked because the phone calls
are routed through “a web of automatic dialers, caller ID spoofing
and voice-over-Internet protocols.” 2 Although the traditional
scheme of TCPA enforcement, with its strong reliance on the private right of action, has been successful in the past, two main issues are becoming clear. The private right of action is limited in
both incentivizing lawsuits against, and deterring the actions of,
intentional violators; and FCC enforcement is limited by its slow
process.
In order for the TCPA to stay relevant after more than
twenty years, certain modifications and improvements can be
made. We recommend improving government enforcement efforts and increasing the uniformity of interpreting the statute.
The FTC’s recent contest for a technical solution to robocalls is
commendable, and should be followed with respect to other types
of media currently exposed to unsolicited commercial messages
such as text messages and e-mail.
In order for the TCPA to continue to remain relevant going forward, this report makes the following recommendations:
x Increase government enforcement of the TCPA by
providing State Attorneys General with a larger incentive to bring TCPA cases, and empowering the
FTC to bring suit under the TCPA;
x Increase uniformity of application of the TCPA by
encouraging more frequent and quicker FCC rulemaking procedures;
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Continue to protect cell phones by requiring prior
express consent for any communication (call or
text) made to a cell phone;
Place a time limit on the Junk Fax Established
Business Relationship;
Create incentives for fax broadcasting companies to
determine whether the faxes they are sending on
behalf of clients are in violation of the TCPA;
Rebuff efforts to remove or otherwise modify the
private right of action; and
Place additional restrictions on entities that enable
caller ID manipulation.
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INTRODUCTION

William L. Kovacs, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, Comments of U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, CG Docket No. 02-278 at 5 (Aug. 30, 2012).
4
S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 1-2 (1991) reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968,
1970 (1991).
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In the late 1980s, Congress considered legislation aimed at
stemming the tide of intrusive telemarketing practices. The debate over the appropriate action culminated in the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA). This report analyzes
and discusses the history of the TCPA and the role of the statute
in modern times. The report examines whether the expansion of
the statute to areas outside of telemarketing was warranted, and
how Congress and the courts might best respond to current issues
and problems.
The impetus for the TCPA was the “onslaught of telemarketing calls [. . .] invading the privacy of American homes.” 3 The
Senate found that “[t]he use of automated equipment to engage in
telemarketing [wa]s generating an increasing number of consumer complaints . . . . The growth of consumer complaints about
these calls ha[d] two sources: the increasing number of telemarketing firms in the business of placing telephone calls, and the
advance of technology which makes automated phone calls more
cost-effective.” 4
Despite the clear focus on telemarketing practices during
the debate over the TCPA, the statute is more than just telemarketing regulation. The TCPA was brought about by a determination that advances in technology had allowed an increase in access to consumers. Whether the individual was a telemarketer or
not, Congress was determined to regulate intrusive technology,
specifically, autodialers and the practice of sending unsolicited
fax advertisements.
The TCPA was amended, adapted, and supplemented
over time to address advances in technology and new practices in
which that technology was being applied. The TCPA is more
than a simple “junk fax law” and is rightfully applied to areas
outside of the telemarketing industry.
The TCPA has been relatively successful over the past
two decades. The Do-Not-Call Registry, an offshoot of the
TCPA, has reduced unwanted telemarketing calls. In addition, a
period of stepped-up government enforcement of the TCPA decreased the number of unsolicited fax advertisement complaints.
Three main issues will impact the TCPA going forward.
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First, new types of TCPA violators, namely those that intentionally disregard the TCPA, are emerging at an increasing rate.
These parties will challenge the traditional dependence on the
private right of action. As a result, increased government enforcement is necessary to target these intentional violators.
Second, it is important that the TCPA remain in place and
that it is effectively enforced to ensure that the intrusive practices
that brought about the legislation do not return.
Finally, the TCPA must be adapted to better respond to
new advances in technology. The issue is not solely focused on
the use of technology to reach consumers in a potentially abusive
fashion. Congress must focus on crafting clear legislation that will
allow entities to effectively communicate with consumers using
new advances in technology.
The principal goals of addressing these issues are balanced
regulation, clear interpretation, and informed consent for consumers. A number of strategies have been employed by Congress
to solve the problem of intrusive access to consumers, but those
strategies have not always provided balance, clarity, and informed consent. Over time, gaps in the legislation and slow interpretive decisions by the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) have created confusion with respect to the legality of certain conduct.
This report sets forth several suggestions and recommendations. To address the new types of TCPA violators, the dependence on private attorneys general must be reduced. A more
targeted focus on the actual technologies being used by these individuals and entities is also necessary to target the source of
TCPA violations along with the cause. For example, the TCPA
should be amended, or supplemented with additional regulation,
which holds third parties liable for hiring entities that violate the
TCPA even when those hired-violators are located offshore.
To address the efficiency of regulating traditional abuses,
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) should be granted authority to bring TCPA enforcement actions and State Attorneys General should be enabled to seek damages equal to the amount recoverable by the FCC under current law. Government
enforcement of the TCPA is necessary, and current efforts have
been lacking by the FCC. The FTC has recently shown an interest in TCPA-related matters, and by giving State Attorneys General a larger incentive to bring TCPA claims, the statute will be
more effectively enforced.
The TCPA also must be adapted to address new technolo-
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gy. The use of cell phones and text message advertising has
grown exponentially. It is important that the FCC quickly issues
clear guidelines that allow for balanced and clear regulation. Industry members have been successful at self-regulation to this
point, but the potential for abuse is apparent. As a result, a
scheme of regulation requiring actual, informed consent should
be obtained prior to sending unsolicited advertisements because
of the special safety and privacy concerns of reaching an individual on his or her cellular phone.
Part I of this report discusses the history of the TCPA and
analyzes its structure. Part II reviews other relevant statutes that
affect the operation of the TCPA. Part III focuses on the implementation of the TCPA and the judicial interpretation that
broadened the scope of the statute to include new areas of regulation and evolving technologies. Part IV discusses the lessons
learned throughout the implementation of the TCPA regarding
successful and unsuccessful approaches to implementation and
consumer protection legislation. Part V considers the overall impact of the TCPA, while Part VI addresses three main issues that
hinder its success today: intentional violators, poor enforcement
processes, and rapidly changing technology. Part VII provides solutions to these obstacles in the form of increased government enforcement, a more uniform application of the statute, and certain
amendments focused on new technology and strengthening the
private right of action.

I. HISTORY OF THE TCPA

See Telemarketers Law & Legal Definition, US LEGAL,
http://definitions.uslegal.com/t/telemarketers/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2013).
6
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 18 F.C.C. Rcd. 14014 (July 3, 2003).
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In the late 1980s, telemarketing calls were becoming
cheaper and easier to complete. The telemarketing industry was
becoming more competitive and was expanding rapidly to reach
as many consumers as possible. In a ten-year period beginning in
1981, spending on telemarketing activities increased from $1 billion to $60 billion.5 By 1990, over 300,000 telemarketers contacted
more than 18 million Americans every day. 6
New technology made it easier for telemarketers to reach
consumers. Autodialers (also known as robocalls) automatically
deliver a prerecorded message to a list of telephone numbers, and
thus remove the need for human representatives. These predic-
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tive dialers were developed to “find better pacing (scheduling of
dialing attempts) by collecting and analyzing data on the proportion of call attempts that are answered, durations of time from
call initiation to answer, and durations of service.” 7 The technology was designed to minimize both the time that telemarketers
must spend waiting between conversations and the amount of
abandoned calls 8 experienced by consumers. 9
A relatively new and increasingly available piece of technology also enabled greater access to consumers by businesses
and marketers alike. The telephone facsimile machine (the fax
machine)—labeled an “office oddity” during the mid-1980s 10—
quickly became a primary tool for business.11 The fax machine is
an effective tool because it automatically accepts, processes, and
prints each message sent. By 1991, more than 30 billion pages of
information were sent via fax each year. 12
By 1991, telemarketing calls were generating about $435
billion in sales annually. 13 The telemarketing and fax broadcast7
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Douglas A. Samuelson, Predictive Dialing for Outbound Telephone Call
Centers, 29 INTERFACES 66, 67 (1999) (“For example, when we call residences
on weekdays, the proportion of call attempts answered typically quadruples
from 5:00 P.M. to 6:00 P.M. Durations of completed calls also change over time
for many applications: for example, if the calls are directed at a specific member of the household who is more likely to be home at 6:00 P.M. than at 5:00
P.M.”).
8
Id. at 66-67 (“Computer-based outbound telephone dialing systems . . .
dial automatically and connect those who answer to live sales or collection representatives, while logging other results. Sometimes someone answers when no
representative is available. Typically the system immediately abandons (hangs
up on) such a call, with the caller paying for telephone charges and wasting
representatives’ time and—more important—with the answering party suffering a nuisance.”)(emphasis added).
9
Id. at 67 (“If all we wanted was to keep the representatives as busy as
possible, we could simply dial every available line all the time. This, however,
would result in large numbers of abandoned calls.”).
10
H.R. REP. NO. 102–317, at 10 (1991).
11
See Telemarketing Practices: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance of the Committee on Energy and Commerce,
House of Representatives, 101st Cong. 101-43 (1989) (Sales of fax machines
grew exponentially. In 1986, there were just 192,000 total fax machines sold,
the following year: almost 500,000, and in 1987: nearly a million fax machines
sold in one year.).
12
H.R. REP. NO. 102–317, at 10 (1991); see also Kaufman v. ACS Sys.,
Inc., 110 Cal. App. 4th 886, 890-94, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 296, 300-03 (2003) (detailing the history of the TCPA).
13
See Seth Stern, Will feds tackle telemarketers?, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR (Apr. 15, 2002), http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0415/p16s01wmcn.html.
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ing industries were expanding at a rapid pace. Sending fax advertisements to potential customers was one of the most costeffective methods of advertisement. 14 One company advertised on
its website that it could “[b]roadcast faxes to millions of customers
daily [. . .],” using its “database that exceeds 30 million fax numbers.” 15
Advertising through telemarketing and fax advertisements
provide benefits to consumers and businesses alike. However,
this process often comes at a cost. Unlike mail advertisements
where the cost is born by the marketer, sending unsolicited faxes
came at a cost to the recipient in the form of ink, paper, and
blocked phone lines. Receiving an unsolicited fax has been compared to receiving advertisements through the mail with postagedue. 16 When marketing is indiscriminately delivered to thousands
or even millions of individuals, these minor costs invariably begin
to mount.
A. Calls for Federal Regulation Begin to Grow

C M
Y K

06/02/2014 15:10:17

14
See S. REP. NO. 109-76, at 3 (2005) (“Industry comments maintained
that ‘faxing is a cost-effective way to reach customers, particularly for small
business for whom faxing is a cheaper way to advertise.”).
15
Covington & Burling v. Int’l Mktg. Research, Inc., No. CIV.A. 010004360, 2003 WL 21384825, at *3 (D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 17, 2003) (detailing
the practices of Fax.com).
16
See 136 CONG. REC. H5818-02, (daily ed. July 30, 1990) (statement of
Rep. Markey discussing how junk faxes are analogous to receiving a letter
with postage-due)(quoting Jerry Knight, The Junk Fax Attack: Why Maryland
May Outlaw Unsolicited Advertisements, WASH. POST, May 23, 1989, at C3).
17
47 U.S.C. § 227 (2011).
18
S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 1 (1991) reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968,
1970 (1991).
19
H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at 6-7 (1991).

35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 10 Side B

Widespread telemarketing abuses brought about the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (“TCPA”). 17 For example, “[h]aving an unlisted number [could not] prevent telemarketers that call numbers randomly or sequentially.” 18 Similarly, “as
tens of thousands of unsolicited fax advertisements per week”
were sent to fax machines throughout the country, 19 consumers
could do little to stop these so called junk faxes from using up
their paper, ink, and toner.
In response to consumer complaints, over forty states
placed regulations on the use of autodialers and prerecorded mes-
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sages, or otherwise restricted telemarketing by 1992. 20 Texas even
enacted legislation that made it a Class C misdemeanor to advertise by sending unsolicited fax advertisements. 21 Unfortunately,
state laws “had limited effect [] because States do not have jurisdiction over interstate calls” 22 and by the late 1980s “[m]any
States [. . .] expressed a desire for Federal legislation to regulate
interstate telemarketing calls to supplement their restrictions on
intrastate calls.” 23 In addition, the state laws had different, and
often conflicting, requirements and prohibitions.
B. The Result: The TCPA
In 1991, Congress stepped in to address “[v]oluminous
consumer complaints about abuses of telephone technology – for
example, computerized calls dispatched to private homes,” 24 and
to “prevent businesses from shifting their advertising costs.” 25 The
TCPA was enacted to “protect the privacy interests of residential
telephone subscribers by placing restrictions on unsolicited, automated telephone calls . . . and to facilitate interstate commerce
by restricting certain uses of facsimile machines and automatic
dialers.” 26
At the heart of the TCPA was an aim to regulate: (1) the
use of computerized autodialing machines that deliver prerecorded messages; and (2) the practice of sending unsolicited fax
advertisements. The TCPA provided a statutory framework for
which the FCC was tasked with interpreting and enforcing.
1. Regulating the use of “Robocalls”

20
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S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 1 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968,
1968 (1991); see also The Chair King, Inc. v. GTE Mobilenet of Houston, Inc.,
184 S.W. 3d 707, 710 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 2006).
21
See The Chair King, Inc., 184 S.W. 3d at 710.
22
S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 3 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968,
1970 (1991).
23
Id.
24
Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 740, 744 (2012).
25
Critchfield Physical Therapy v. Taranto Grp., Inc., 263 P.3d 767, 774
(Kan. 2011) (citing Phillips Randolph v. Adler Weiner Research Chicago, 526
F. Supp. 2d 851, 852 (N.D. Ill. 2007)).
26
S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 1 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968,
1968 (1991); see also The Chair King, Inc., 184 S.W. 3d at 710.
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are used to deliver “artificial or prerecorded voice,” 27 or connect
live operators to recipients after dialing numbers in random or
sequential order. Congress placed a blanket ban on the use of
such technology without the recipient’s consent, but granted the
FCC authority to create exemptions. 28 While the initial blanket
ban provided a very basic, clear method of regulation, the provision for exemptions would prove counterproductive.
The TCPA required parties using automatic dialing systems to “automatically release the called party’s line within 5 seconds of the time that the calling party’s system is notified of the
called party’s hang-up.” 29 Additionally, “all artificial or prerecorded telephone messages delivered by an “autodialer” must
clearly state the identity of the caller at the beginning of the message and the caller’s telephone number or address during or after
the message.” 30
In the 1992 TCPA Order, the FCC set requirements regarding company-specific do-not-call lists, placed other technical
requirements on telemarketing practices, and created the first exemption for parties with an established business relationship
(EBR). The FCC’s action attempted to achieve a more balanced
regulation, and to provide consumers with informed choice.
In recognition of the importance of consumer choice, and
the possibility that some consumers value communications from
certain entities, 31 the FCC provided that any person engaged in
telephone solicitation must maintain “company-specific do-not-
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See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1) (2011).
See id. at § 227(b)(1)(B) (“to initiate any telephone call to any residential
telephone line using an artificial or prerecorded voice to deliver a message
without the prior express consent of the called party, unless the call is initiated
for emergency purposes or is exempted by rule or order by the [FCC] under
paragraph (2)(B).”) (emphasis added); See id. at § 227(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) (“To use of
autodialers and prerecorded messages to place calls to an emergency telephone
line, to health care facilities, to radio common carrier services, and to services
for which the called party is charged for the call, except in emergencies or with
the prior express consent of the called party”).
29
Rules & Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act of 1991, 7 F.C.C. Rcd. 8752, 8778 ¶ 52 (Oct. 16, 1992).
30
Id. at 8779 ¶ 53.
31
See id. at 8757 ¶ 9 (During its initial rulemaking, the FCC concluded
that even though “there are separate privacy concerns associated with [robocalls] as opposed to live operator solicitations (e.g. calls placed by recorded
message players can be more difficult for the consumer to reject or avoid), the
record as a whole indicates that consumers who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations would object to either form of solicitation.”).
28
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call lists.” 32 The Order also placed new time limits on acceptable
hours for telemarketing to protect consumer privacy and prevent
nuisance. 33 The EBR exemption was based on the conclusion that
a telephone solicitation to someone with whom a prior business
relationship exists does not adversely affect the privacy interests
of the recipient. 34 However, it did not provide clear guidelines on
how an EBR is actually created. Restrictions on robocalls were
also reduced. Coupled with the EBR exemption, the TCPA now
permitted robocalls to residential phone lines on the basis of a
mere inquiry by the recipient concerning the products or services
of the calling party. 35
2. Banning Unsolicited Fax Advertisements
The TCPA made it “unlawful for any person within the
United States . . . to use any telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a
telephone facsimile machine.” 36 Originally, “unsolicited advertisement” was defined as “any material advertising the commercial availability of any property, goods, or services, which is
transmitted to any person without that person’s prior express invitation or permission.” 37
Unlike the ban on robocalls, the TCPA’s ban on unsolicited fax advertisements was absolute and did not grant the FCC
authority to create exemptions. 38 Congress recognized that fax
advertisements were not only intrusive, but that additional costshifting concerns not present in phone communications justified a
complete ban.
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See id. at 8765 ¶ 23 (The FCC determined that “the company-specific
do-not-call list alternative is the most effective and efficient means to permit
telephone subscribers to avoid unwanted telephone solicitations.”).
33
See id. at 8767-68 ¶ 26 (The FCC determined that it was reasonable to
subject telemarketers to the same time of day restrictions as are imposed on
debt collectors under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and prohibited
calls before the hour of 8 AM and after 9 PM, local time at the called party’s
location.).
34
See id.
35
See id. at 8771 ¶ 35.
36
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (2011).
37
Id. at § 227(a)(4).
38
Rules & Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act of 1991, 7 F.C.C. Rcd. at n. 87 (The FCC acknowledged the limits imposed
by the TCPA prior to implementing a “junk fax” EBR and stated, “[i]n banning telephone facsimile advertisements, the TCPA leaves the [FCC] without
discretion to create exemptions from or limit the effects of the prohibition.”).
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In the 1992 TCPA Order, the FCC determined that fax
advertisements sent to recipients by entities with which they had
an EBR would be “deemed to be invited or permitted by the recipient.” 39 This exemption was an attempt to achieve a more balanced approach. However, like the telemarketing EBR exemption, it came at the cost of clarity and shifted costs back to the
consumer. Despite the ability to call and request that the entity
stop sending unsolicited advertisements, the consumer must at
least bear the cost of the initial fax and take the time to call and
opt-out of further advertisements—with each entity that sends an
unwanted advertisement. 40
3. The Private Right of Action

39
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Id.
See Rules & Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 7 F.C.C. Rcd. at 8752 ¶ 190 (July 3, 2003) (“Unlike the donot-call list for telemarketing calls, Congress provided no mechanism for opting out of unwanted facsimile advertisements. Such an opt-out list would require the recipient to possibly bear the cost of the initial facsimile and inappropriately place the burden on the recipient to contact the sender and request
inclusion on a “do-not-fax” list.”) (emphasis added).
41
See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (2011).
42
See 47 U.S.C. § 227(f) (2011).
43
See 47 U.S.C. § 503 (2012).
44
See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (2011).
40
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The TCPA has three enforcement mechanisms. First, consumers have a private right of action in which they can sue an entity that has allegedly violated the TCPA for damages and injunctive relief. 41 Second, a state attorney general (or another
official or agency designated by the state) may bring a civil lawsuit for damages and injunctive relief when a case involves a
“pattern or practice of violations.” 42 Last, the FCC is authorized
to enforce monetary forfeiture penalties against individuals and
entities that violate the TCPA. 43
Consumers bringing suit under the TCPA may seek damages of $500 per violation or actual monetary loss, whichever is
greater. The court has discretion to award treble damages, if the
defendant “willfully or knowingly” violated the TCPA. 44
From the outset, the TCPA was designed to rely on enforcement by private parties. One of the original sponsors of the
TCPA, Senator Hollings, stated that “[the private right of action]
will make it easier for consumers to recover damages from receiv-
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ing these computerized calls.” 45 Senator Hollings continued,
“[s]mall claims court or a similar court would allow the consumer
to appear before the court without an attorney. The amount of
damages in this legislation is set to be fair to both the consumer
and the telemarketer.” 46
Some critics of the TCPA maintain that the statutory
damages provision coupled with the possibility of a class action
provides “too strong of a hammer” for “too little an injury.” While
the TCPA provides a private right of action and statutory damages for consumers that may have experienced little or no actual
harm, this is not uncommon. 47 In Crabill v. Trans Union L.L.C., 48
the Seventh Circuit noted, “[m]any statutes, notably consumerprotection statutes, authorize the award of damages for violations
that cause so little measurable injury that the cost of proving up
damages would exceed the damages themselves, making the right
to sue nugatory.” 49 The court further indicated, “[t]he award of
statutory damages could also be thought a form of bounty system,
and Congress is permitted to create legally enforceable bounty
systems for assistance in enforcing federal laws, provided the
bounty is a reward for redressing an injury of some sort (though
not necessarily an injury to the bounty hunter)[.]” 50

II. ANALOGOUS FEDERAL REGULATION AND TCPA
OVERLAP

A. Congress Tackles Telemarketing Fraud: the Telemarketing Act
Telemarketing fraud continued to grow in the early
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45
137 CONG. REC. S16204-01 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991)(statement of Senator Hollings).
46
Id. Many critics of TCPA class actions have pointed to Senator Hollings’ statements and the “individualized” nature of receiving an unwanted call
or fax as support for holding that TCPA class actions are per se inappropriate.
47
Crabill v. Trans Union, LLC, 259 F.3d 662, 665 (7th Cir. 2001).
48
Id. at 662.
49
Id. at 665.
50
Id.
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The TCPA is supplemented by a number of other laws
and government agencies. Congress’ later efforts in enacting legislation similar to the TCPA helps demonstrate that the statute is
not solely designed to target telemarketing practices and that not
all technology should be regulated in the same manner.
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1990s, 51 and the estimated cost of such practices hit $40 billion in
1993. 52 The response from Congress came in the form of the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act (the
“Telemarketing Act”), which gave the FTC power to regulate
abusive practices by telemarketers. 53
The Telemarketing Act is limited in both scope and jurisdiction. The FTC’s rules apply only to telemarketing, which is
defined as any “plan, program, or campaign which is conducted
to induce the purchase of goods or services by use of one or more
telephones and which involves more than one interstate telephone call.” 54
In contrast to the TCPA’s broad prohibitions on the use of
certain technology and flexible application, the Telemarketing
Act focuses more particularly on specific conduct and applies only to those parties within the FTC’s jurisdiction. 55 The Telemarketing Act applies specifically to behavior “causing any telephone
to ring, or engaging any person in telephone conversation, repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse or harass any
person.” 56
B. Congress Confronts E-Mail Spam: the CAN-SPAM Act
As new technology is developed, marketers utilize new
forms of media to reach consumers in the most cost-effective way.
In the late 1990s, marketers began to shift their focus from fax to
e-mail. 57 The practice of sending unsolicited e-mail advertisements soon came to be known as “spamming.”
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51
See DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER
PROTECTION AND THE LAW 505 (2009-2010 ed.) (Defining telemarketing fraud
as: “the deceptive sale of goods or services over the telephone.”).
52
See id.
53
15 U.S.C. § 6102 (2006).
54
16 C.F.R. § 310.2(u) (2003).
55
Telemarketing Sales Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,842 (Aug. 23, 1995) (codified
as 16 C.F.R. § 310 (2010)).
56
Id. § 310.4(b)(1).
57
THE DIRECT MARKETING ASSOCIATION, 2001 STATISTICAL FACT
BOOK
25
(23rd
ed.
2001),
http://courses.washington.edu/emba532a/2001Factbook.pdf (“Direct Marketing Methods Used by Marketers (2001): Direct mail (other than catalogs) is still
the number one direct marketing method used by marketers (Fax marketing
(outbound) – 12% [2000]; 23% [1999])—outbound telemarketing also decreased, from 37% (1999), to 32% (2000); the increase: “e-mail to prospects:
from 28% to 42% (1999-2000)” and “e-mail to customers: from 28% to 42%
(1999 to 2000).”).
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Unsolicited commercial e-mail and unsolicited bulk e-mail
are the two most common definitions of spam. Although the
TCPA does not cover e-mail, 58 considering the regulation of other
forms of commercial advertising is useful when analyzing the
TCPA as the primary justifications for regulating unsolicited fax
advertisements and unsolicited e-mail advertisements are the
same: to prevent costs and inconvenience imposed upon consumers. 59
By the time Congress enacted the Controlling the Assault
of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act (“CANSPAM”) in 2003, 60 thirty-seven states already had anti-spam laws
in effect. 61 This legislation embodied a different regulatory
scheme than the TCPA in a number of ways. First, CAN-SPAM
does not outright prohibit commercial e-mails. Second, CANSPAM recognizes that spam e-mail proliferates by certain practices and prohibits such conduct. Lastly, unlike the TCPA, there
is no private right of action.
In contrast to the TCPA’s general ban on unsolicited fax
advertisements, CAN-SPAM regulates, rather than prohibits,
commercial e-mails. 62 Similar to the Telemarketing Act and its
focus on fraudulent and deceptive practices, Congress was primarily concerned with misleading or fraudulent commercial email. 63 As a result, it is predicated upon identification requirements and prohibits commercial e-mails that contain false header
information 64 and deceptive subject headings. 65
58
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Unless sent to a cell phone and received by that cell phone as a text
message.
59
See David E. Sorkin, Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 1001 (Fall 1997).
60
Act of Dec. 16, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699.
61
Stefanie Olsen, Ad Groups Lobby for Antispam Law, CNETNEWS.COM
(Nov. 13, 2003, 2:29 PM), http://news.cnet.com/Ad-groups-lobby-for-antispamlaw/2100-1024_3-5107059.html); see also Grant Yang, CAN-SPAM: A First
Step to No-Spam, 4 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1 (Fall 2004).
62
See CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7701 et seq.
63
Id. at § 2(b)(2).
64
Id. at § 5(a)(1) (“It is unlawful for any person to initiate the transmission, to a protected computer, of a commercial electronic mail message, or a
transactional or relationship message, that contains, or is accompanied by,
header information that is materially false or materially misleading.”).
65
Id. at § 5(a)(2) (“It is unlawful for any person to initiate the transmission
to a protected computer of a commercial electronic mail message if such person
has actual knowledge, or knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective
circumstances, that a subject heading of the message would be likely to mislead a recipient, acting reasonably under the circumstances, about a material
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Congress recognized that certain practices allowed for an
increase in the amount of spam sent. For example, CAN-SPAM
prohibits the practice of harvesting e-mails from the Internet,
which seeks to prevent a spammer from building a large database
of e-mail addresses to which spam may be sent. 66 The statute targets both the cause and the source of the e-mail spam problem by
regulating the entities responsible for the content (i.e., products or
services being advertised), the individuals sending out the spam,
and holds third parties liable for hiring offshore spammers who
engage in such practices. 67
CAN-SPAM does not include a private right of action, but
is enforced primarily by the FTC, 68 and allows for civil actions to
be brought by Internet Service Providers 69 and State Attorneys
General. 70 Critics consider the lack of a private right of action a
significant failure in deterring spammers. 71 However, providing
such a mechanism may have little practical effect. The proliferation of e-mail spam is the result of both a group of intentional violators determined to operate without regard to existing regulation, and a practice dominated by advertising products that are
illegal (e.g., prescription drugs delivered without a prescription
required). Additionally, these CAN-SPAM violators utilize technology that makes their detection difficult, which makes en-
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fact regarding the contents or subject matter of the message (consistent with
the criteria used in enforcement of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act (15 U.S.C. § 45)”).
66
See Id. at § 5(b)(1)(A)(i) (“[. . .](i) the electronic mail address of the recipient was obtained using an automated means from an Internet website or proprietary online service operated by another person, and such website or online
service included, at the time the address was obtained, a notice stating that the
operator of such website or online service will not give, sell, or otherwise transfer addresses maintained by such website or online service to any other party
for the purposes of initiating, or enabling others to initiate, electronic mail
messages.”); see also Grant Yang, CAN-SPAM: A First Step to No-Spam, 4
CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1 (Fall 2004) (indicating that § 5(b)(1)(A)(i)
“would be ‘harvesting’ and §5(b)(1)(A)(ii) “would be ‘dictionary’ attacks.”).
67
Id. at § 6(a).
68
Id. at § 7(a).
69
Id. at § 7(g).
70
Id. at § 7(f).
71
See Yang, supra note 61 (citing Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director,
Electronic Privacy Information Center, Testimony and Statement of Record
before the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation (May 21,
2003), http://epic.org/privacy/iei/testimony2806.pdf); see also Declan McCullagh, Bush OKs Spam Bill—But Critics Not Convinced, CNETNEWS.COM
(Dec. 16, 2003, 7:05 AM), http://news.cnet.com/Bush-OKs-spam-bill—butcritics-not-convinced/2100-1028_3-5124724.html.
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forcement by private parties also very difficult.

III. ADAPTATION OF THE TCPA
As the district court said in Accounting Outsourcing,
“Congress is not required to develop a perfect solution before instituting measures to incrementally correct a problem.” 72 Since
Congress introduced the TCPA in 1991, it has been amended
twice, 73 augmented by numerous FCC rules, and interpreted by
thousands of judicial decisions. It has been applied to new areas
and technology not originally contemplated in 1991, including
debt collection practices and text messaging technology.
Some critics argue that this expansion of the TCPA is inappropriate and would seek to label the TCPA as a statute that
strictly regulates telemarketing. Yet, the statute makes no mention of telemarketers. It was designed to protect the privacy interests of consumers and to respond to advances in technology.
Therefore, the expansion of the TCPA into other areas that evoke
these same concerns may be justified.
The TCPA creates a right that did not exist at common
law. Typically, in order for a state consumer protection law to be
implicated, there must be some showing of harm, fraud, or deception. 74 Judicial interpretation of the TCPA as a technologyregulating, rather than harm-compensating statute explains the
adaptability of the statute. Such interpretation has allowed the
TCPA to remain effective when addressing new technology and
to be applied to emerging areas of concern, such as debt collection.

Judicial interpretations of the TCPA are largely focused
on regulating the use of technology. For example, the district
court in Hinman held, “On its face, the statute prohibits the sending of unsolicited fax advertisements and makes no reference at
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72
Accounting Outsourcing, LLC v. Verizon Wireless Pers. Commc’ns.,
L.P., 329 F.Supp.2d 789, 817 (M.D. La. 2004).
73
See Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-21, 119 Stat. 359;
see also Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-331, 124 Stat. 3572.
74
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, CONSUMER
PROTECTION LAW DEVELOPMENTS, 1, 59 (Mar. 2009).
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all to receipt, much less to printing.” 75 In Satterfield, the 9th Circuit held that a prohibited call is not dependent on a successful
connection. 76 Similarly, the Arizona Court of Appeals in Joffe,
stated that it was “the act of making the call. . .” that led to TCPA
liability. 77
B. Targeting the Use of Technology: TCPA’s Expansion to Debt
Collection

75
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Hinman v. M&M Rental Ctr., Inc., 596 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1158 (N.D.
Ill. 2009).
76
See Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2009).
77
Joffe v. Acacia Mortgage Corporation, 121 P.3d 831, 836 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2005).
78
Griffith v. Consumer Portfolio Serv., Inc., 838 F. Supp. 2d 723 (N.D.
Ill. 2011).
79
Id. at 727 (“We reject [the] argument that the TCPA only applies to telemarketing, not debt collection.”).
80
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG Docket No. 02-278, FCC 07-232 at ¶ 11 (Jan. 4, 2008)
(emphasis added).
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In 2011, the district court in Consumer Portfolio Serv., 78
rejected the assertion that the TCPA applied only to telemarketers. 79 The court pointed to the FCC’s January 2008 TCPA Order
which states, “The plain language of section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) prohibits the use of autodialers to make any call to a wireless number
in the absence of [. . .] the prior express consent of the called party. We note this prohibition applies regardless of the content of
the call, and is not limited only to calls that constitute ‘telephone
solicitation.’” 80 This opened the door to apply the TCPA to the
debt collection industry.
Although Congress did not intend to directly regulate debt
collection practices with the TCPA, it did intend to protect consumers from autodialers and such protections have been afforded
to consumers’ cell phones. Debt collection came into the crosshairs of the TCPA because of the industry’s use of such technologies.
The typical TCPA-related debt collection situation is most
clearly presented by Judge Easterbrook in Soppet:
Customer incurs a debt and does not pay. Creditor hires
Bill Collector to dun Customer for the money. Bill Collector puts
a machine on the job and repeatedly calls Cell Number, at which
Customer had agreed to receive phone calls by giving his phone
number to Creditor. The machine, called a predictive dialer,
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works autonomously until a human voice comes on the line. If
that happens, an employee in Bill Collector’s call center will join
the call. But Customer no longer subscribes to Cell Number,
which has been reassigned to Bystander. A human being who
called Cell Number would realize that Customer was no longer
the subscriber. But predictive dialers lack human intelligence
and, like the buckets enchanted by the Sorcerer’s Apprentice,
continue until stopped by their true master. Meanwhile Bystander is out of pocket the cost of airtime minutes and has had to listen to a lot of useless voicemail. 81
Under the TCPA, the Defendants must have had “the prior express consent of the called party.” 82 The Defendants in Soppet argued that they had express permission to call “Cell Number” 83 and reasoned that even though “Bystander” now used “Cell
Number,” the “called party” for purposes of the TCPA was the
party they intended to call (i.e., “Customer”). 84 As a result, the call
would be legal under the TCPA. 85 The court disagreed, and held
that the “called party” means the “person subscribing to the called
number at the time the call is made.” 86 As a result, even after receiving express consent to call a number, debt collectors (or other
entities using an autodialer) must make certain that number still
belongs to the person that provided the consent.
C. Addressing Advances in Technology

81
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Soppet v. Enhanced Recovery, LLC, 679 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 2012)
(citing Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 23 FCC Rcd. 559 ¶¶ 9, 10 (Jan. 4, 2008)).
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 637.
85
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1) (2011) (“It shall be unlawful for any person within
the United States, or any person outside the United States if the recipient is
within the United States—(A) to make any call (other than a call made for
emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party)
using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded
voice. . .”).
86
Soppet v. Enhanced Recovery, LLC, 679 F.3d at 643.
87
FED. TRADE COMM’N, COLLECTING CONSUMER: DEBT THE
CHALLENGES
OF
CHANGE,
17
(Feb.
2009),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/collecting-consumer-
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The use of cellular phones has greatly increased over the
past decade. In June 2008 there were 263 million cell phone subscribers in the United States, and 16% of those subscribers had
replaced their residential home phone with cell phones. 87 In De-
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cember 2011, the number of U.S. cell phone subscribers (315.9
million)88 exceeded the U.S. population (312.6 million)89 for the
first time. The increased use of cellular phones brings a renewed
justification for the TCPA because safety, privacy, and costshifting concerns are even greater when robocallers or other technology is used to reach a consumer on their cell phone.
1. The TCPA and Cellular Phone Calls
Cell phones present increased privacy and safety concerns
because consumers bring their cell phones wherever they go. 90
With respect to safety, a ringing cell phone presents a dangerous
distraction while driving. A 2009 study by the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration indicated that cell phone use was
involved in 18% of fatalities in distraction-related crashes. 91 Recognizing these special concerns, the TCPA has been interpreted to
ban the use of autodialers to make non-emergency calls without
prior express consent to any cell phone. 92
The protection granted to cell phones is also necessary to
prevent cost-shifting. This is especially relevant for consumers
with prepaid cell phone plans, which, as of June 2012, made up
over 23% of all wireless subscribers (74.9 million). 93 Unwanted
calls use up limited prepaid minutes and text messages. Here,
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debts-challenges-change-federal-trade-commission-workshop-report/dcwr.pdf.
88
CTIA, BACKGROUND ON CTIA’S SEMI-ANNUAL WIRELESS INDUSTRY
SURVEY (2013) [hereinafter CTIA WIRELESS SURVEY], available at
http://files.ctia.org/pdf/CTIA_Survey_YE_2012_Graphics-FINAL.pdf.
89
Monthly Population Estimates for the United States: April 1, 2010 to
December
1,
2014,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?s
rc=bkmk (last visited Apr. 3, 2014).
90
Shannon D. Torgerson, Getting Down to Business: How the Established Business Relationship Exemption to the National Do-Not-Call Registry
Forces Consumers to Pay for Unwanted Sales Calls, 3 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 24, ¶ 38-40 (Fall 2004) (“the very nature of mobile communication technologies makes unsolicited sales calls to these devices more intrusive, inconvenient, and dangerous than similar calls made to stationary, landline residential phones.”).
91
Letter from National Association of Attorneys General to Congress
(Dec.
7,
2011),
available
at
http://signon.s3.amazonaws.com/20111207.signon.Final_HR3035_Letter.pdf
(citing http://distraction.gov/stats-and-facts/index.html).
92
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A) (2011); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(1)(iii).
93
CTIA, Semi-Annual Wireless Industry Survey (June 2012),
http://www.ctia.org/resource-library/press-releases/archive/consumer-datatraffic-increased-104-percent (in June 2011, 306 million total U.S. subscribers).
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more than ever, consumers bear the costs of telemarketing calls.
2. The TCPA and Text Messages
Cellular telephone users are able to send and receive 160character messages through short message service (SMS), or “text
messaging.” In 2003, the FCC determined that the TCPA’s ban
on autodialers encompasses both voice and text calls. 94 In 2009,
the 9th Circuit agreed with the FCC’s determination that the
TCPA applied to text messages. 95 In Satterfield v. Simon &
Schuster, the court held that a text message is a “call” within the
meaning of the TCPA. 96 The putative plaintiff class had received
the following text-message advertisement:
The next call may be your last . . . Join the Stephen
King VIP Mobile Club at www.cellthebook.com.
RplySTOP2OptOut. PwdbyNexton. 97
The 9th Circuit found that Congress intended “to call” to
mean “to communicate with a person by telephone.” 98 Consequently, to hold that a text message was “a call” under the TCPA
was consistent with the plain meaning and purpose of the
TCPA. 99 The court then noted that the TCPA targeted “communicat[ing] with others in a manner that would be an invasion
of privacy” and “a voice or a text message are not distinguishable
in terms of being an invasion of privacy.” 100 As a result, advertisers are prohibited from sending text messages using autodialers or
without the prior express consent of the recipient.

Congress has amended the TCPA twice since 1991 to address new technologies and practices. Similarly, the FCC has
used various techniques of regulation, such as company-specific
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94
See Report and Order, In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG Docket No. 02-278, FCC 03153 ¶ 165 (July 3, 2003).
95
Satterfield, 569 F.3d at 952.
96
Id.; see also Abbas v. Selling Source, LLC, No. 09 CV 3413, 2009 WL
4884471 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2009); see also Joffe, 121 P.3d 831.
97
Satterfield, 569 F.3d at 949.
98
Id. at 954.
99
Id.
100
Id.
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opt-out lists and consent derived from EBR interactions. However, the FCC’s perceived value of certain forms of communication
as well as consumers’ tolerance for unwanted advertisements appears to have decreased over time. 101 As a result, there has been a
shift away from such techniques and a move toward informed
consumer choice.
A. Company Specific Opt-Out Schemes are Inefficient

101
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See e.g., Rules & Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991, 18 F.C.C. Rcd. 14014, 14129 ¶ 38 (July 3, 2003).
102
Rules & Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 7 F.C.C. Rcd. 8752, 8772 ¶ 38 (Oct. 16, 1992).
103
Id. at 8767 ¶ 25; see also Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. §
310.4(c) (2010).
104
Delivery Restrictions, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c); Prior to amendment: 16
C.F.R. § 310.9(b)(iii)(A) (2010).
105
Id.
106
Telemarketing Sales Rule, Final Amended Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4,629
(Jan. 29, 2003) (codified at 16 C.F.R. § 310 (2010)).
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By 2000, the TCPA and Telemarketing Act had been in
place for the better part of a decade, although consumer complaints continued to mount. In response, the FTC began a comprehensive review that analyzed the effectiveness of existing
regulations. Of particular concern was the current companyspecific opt-out scheme in place for telemarketing solicitations.
While autodialers and prerecorded messages were heavily restricted, calls conducted by live agents were limited only by identification 102 and time of day 103 requirements, and the keeping of
company-specific opt-out lists.
Until 2003, both the FCC and FTC required telemarketers
to maintain company-specific do-not call lists, 104 which required
consumers to request each individual telemarketer not to call
them again. 105 According to the FTC, the original companyspecific do-not-call list was “intended to prohibit abusive patterns
of calls from a seller or telemarketer to a person.” 106 Ideally, the
company-specific opt-out list prevented abusive patterns by empowering consumers to prevent calls from specific callers, while
still being able to receive other telemarketing calls.
The findings of the FTC review of the company-specific
technique are helpful in understanding the change in enforcement
mechanisms. It revealed that members of the industry generally
supported the company-specific approach, “stating that it provides consumer choice and satisfies the consumer protection
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mandate of the Telemarketing Act while not imposing an undue
burden on the industry.” 107 However, “the vast majority of individual commenters [. . .] joined by consumer groups and state law
enforcement representatives, claimed that [the] company-specific
‘do-not-call’ provision [was] inadequate to prevent the abusive
patterns of calls it was intended to prohibit.” 108
The FTC agreed with the consumer side and found that:
x

The company-specific approach is burdensome
to consumers, who must repeat their “do-notcall” request with every company that calls;

x

Consumers have no way to verify their names
have been taken off of a company’s calling list;
and

x

A company-specific approach does nothing to
prohibit the first call from a telemarketer, and
many consumers find even an initial call from a
telemarketer to be abusive and an invasion of
privacy. 109

The FCC concurred with such findings and removed the
company-specific opt-out approach in 2003.
B. Empowering Consumers: the National Do-Not-Call Registry

x
107

A “telemarketer” 111 may not initiate an outbound

C M
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Id. (citing comments made by ARDA, ATA, Bell Atlantic, DMA, ERA,
and MPA).
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
A “telemarketer” is defined as “any person who, in connection with telemarketing . . . initiates telephone calls to or from a customer or donor.” Tele-

35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 18 Side A

After abandoning the company-specific approach, the
FTC established the National Do-Not-Call Registry (“DNCR”) in
late January 2003. 110 The implementation of the DNCR was a
dynamic change in regulation: rather than company-specific optout lists, it created a universal opt-out list which required a telemarketer to seek the recipient’s consent prior to placing any calls.
The DNCR opened for consumers to register their numbers on June 27, 2003, and enforcement began on October 1,
2003. The Telemarketing Sales Rule established that:
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telephone call to a person whose telephone number appears on the national registry;
x

A “seller” 112 may not cause a telemarketer to initiate such calls; and

x

A person may not use the Registry for purposes
other than complying with the Telemarketing
Sales Rule. 113

As a result, consumers were further protected from telemarketing calls. The expanded regulations reached both interand intrastate phone calls 114 and required more entities 115 to abide
by the prohibitions listed above.
C. The Established Business Relationship Exemption Is Not
Informed Consent

C M
Y K

06/02/2014 15:10:17

marketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310.2(bb) (2010). “Telemarketing” is defined
as “a plan, program, or campaign which is conducted to induce the purchase of
goods or services or a charitable contribution, by use of one or more telephones
and which involves more than one interstate telephone call.” 16 C.F.R. §
310.2(cc).
112
A “seller” is defined as “a person who, in connection with a telemarketing transaction, provides, offers to provide, or arranges for others to provide
goods or services to the customer in exchange for consideration.” Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310.2(z) (2010).
113
16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B).
114
Id.
115
Id. (Entities such as banks, credit unions, and savings and loans institutions are not subject to FTC rule. However, they are subject to FCC rules
and regulations.).
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A recurring trend in telemarketing regulation is to create a
strict, opt-in or consent-based scheme followed by an agency rule
creating an exemption for parties with an “Established Business
Relationship.” For example, the purpose of the Do-Not-Call Registry was to provide consumers with the ability to universally optout of telemarketing phone call solicitations. Perhaps a bit uneasy
about this “all-or-nothing” type of regulation, the FCC established that a party with an EBR could legally call a recipient
even if that recipient had listed its number on the DNCR.
This provision was similar to the EBR recognized by the
FCC in the junk fax provision and attempted to recognize that
communications between those with an established relationship
have less invasion of privacy concerns and may even be useful to
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and wanted by consumers. The DNCR EBR was eventually removed while the junk fax EBR survived when codified by Congress in the Junk Fax Prevention Act.
1. The Do-Not-Call Registry EBR
The Do-Not-Call Registry originally recognized an EBR
limited in duration, which allowed a telemarketer to legally call a
consumer on the Registry so long as the consumer had not previously asked to be placed on the seller’s company-specific do-notcall list. 116 The EBR in the Do-Not-Call Registry reflected a compromise that acknowledged that consumers might reasonably expect a call from a business, but that call may only be expected for
a reasonable amount of time after the consumer contacts the
business.
However, the exemption resulted in significant confusion
for consumers that had registered their numbers on the Registry.
By 2012, both the FTC and FCC had removed the exemption.
The FTC was “persuaded by the number of comments opposing
[the EBR], lack of consumer confidence in industry assurances to
self-regulate and not abuse consumers, consumer privacy concerns, and the difficulty in stopping unwanted calls.” 117 Today,
telemarketing calls to residential lines registered on the Do-NotCall Registry require prior written consent, “even where the caller
and called party [had] an EBR.” 118
2. The Junk Fax EBR

116
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Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B)(ii) (2010) (An
established business relationship existed if the consumer had (i) purchased,
rented, or leased goods or services from the seller or entered into a financial
transaction with the seller within the eighteen months immediately preceding
the date of the telemarketing call; or (ii) made an “inquiry or application regarding a product or service offered by the seller, within the three months immediately preceding the date of a telemarketing call.”); See Charles V. Gall and
Margaret M. Stolar, Federal and State Telemarketing Developments, 59 BUS.
LAW. 1241, 1243 (May 2004) (citing 16 C.F.R. § 310.2(n) (2010)).
117
Telemarketing Sales Rule, Final Rule Amendments, 73 Fed. Reg.
51,164 (Aug. 29, 2008).
118
Id.
119
Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of
1991, 18 F.C.C. Rcd. 14014, 14127–28 ¶ 190 (July 3, 2003) (“As of the effective
date of these rules, the EBR will no longer be sufficient to show that an indi-
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In 2003, the FCC announced that it would no longer recognize an EBR exemption for unsolicited fax advertisement. 119
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vidual or business has given their express permission to receive unsolicited advertisements.”).
120
Id. (“[r]ecipients of these faxed advertisements assume the cost of the
paper used, the cost associated with the use of the facsimile machine, and the
costs associated with the time spent receiving a facsimile advertisement during
which the machine cannot be used by its owner to send or receive other facsimile transmissions.”).
121
Id.
122
Junk Fax Prevention Act, Pub L. No. 109-21, 119 Stat. 359 (2005).
123
S. REP. NO. 109-76, at 4 (2005).
124
Id.

35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 19 Side B

The FCC stated, “[t]he record in this proceeding reveals consumers and businesses receive faxes they believe they have neither solicited nor given their permission to receive” and also acknowledged the cost-shifting nature of junk fax. 120 Consequently, the
FCC determined that only written and signed express permission
would be adequate to send a fax advertisement. 121
With the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005 (“JFPA”), 122
Congress effectively overruled the FCC’s decision, finding that
“the revised interpretation would have significant, unintended
consequences that harmed consumers.” 123 However, those findings largely relied on the burden imposed on businesses by the
proposed written consent requirement.
The Senate report on the JFPA gave the following examples: “restaurants would not be able to fax a menu to a consumer
who called and requested one unless the caller provided them
with written consent (presumably by fax) or had one on file. Additionally, [. . .] potential homebuyers often call and request faxes
when passing by homes for sale [. . .] the FCC’s new requirement
for a written signature would effectively prevent realtors from
faxing potential new home buyers the listing information they requested when they made such calls, adding unnecessary hurdles
and delays even when consumers clearly wanted to receive the
faxes as quickly as possible.” 124
The Senate report focuses on the issue of written consent.
However, in each case listed above, a consumer is making an active choice to seek information from a business. The information
being sought is not an unsolicited advertisement. Moreover, the
two examples demonstrate instances where a consumer would
expect a response in a limited period of time (immediately). The
examples do not involve instances in which the consumer would
then expect an unsolicited fax advertisement months or even
years down the road.
Instead of using the above examples to tackle the FCC’s
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proposed requirement of written consent, Congress used them as
justification for expressly codifying the EBR previously recognized by the FCC. 125 The result is a much broader, more indirect
way that a sender can achieve consent to send an otherwise unsolicited fax advertisement. Compared to the examples above
where individuals are calling and requesting information, in order to send an unsolicited fax advertisement pursuant to an EBR
only two prerequisites must be established:
1. The recipient’s number must be obtained
through voluntary communication within the
context of the established business relationship,126 or by the recipient voluntarily placing its
number in a directory, advertisement, or on a
website for public distribution; 127 and
2. The unsolicited advertisement must contain a
notice 128 on the first page of the advertisement, 129
which provides a cost-free mechanism 130 for the
recipient to opt-out of further unsolicited advertising sent by the sender. 131

125
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Delivery Restrictions, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(6) (2011) (an EBR means
“a prior or existing relationship formed by a voluntary two-way communication between a person or entity and a business or residential subscriber with or
without an exchange of consideration, on the basis of an inquiry, application,
purchase or transaction” by the business or residential subscriber regarding
products or services offered by such person or entity, which relationship has
not been previously terminated by either party).
126
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C)(ii)(I) (2011).
127
Id. at § 227(b)(1)(C)(ii)(II).
128
Id. at § 227(b)(1)(C)(iii).
129
Id. at § 227(b)(1)(D)(i).
130
Id. at § 227(b)(1)(D)(iv)(II).
131
Id. at § 227(b)(1)(D).
132
Delivery Restrictions, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4)(vi) (2011).
133
Id.
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An EBR may be terminated by an opt-out request. 132 If a
consumer continues to do business with a company after optingout, a sender may resume sending fax advertisements to a consumer only after that consumer subsequently provides his express
invitation or permission to the sender. 133 However, this EBR
technique ignores the inefficiencies that come with companyspecific opt-out schemes, namely, that the consumer must pay for
the first unwanted fax and then call to stop future unwanted fax-
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es from each individual sender. 134
Critics of the JFPA often point to the fact that the sender
need not receive the recipient’s fax number directly from the recipient, but can pull it from the recipient’s website, for example. 135 Additionally, there is no requirement that an entity inform
the recipient that in so giving its fax number it may now receive
unsolicited fax advertisements from the particular sender. 136 This,
coupled with the relative ease of establishing and unlimited period of time that an EBR exists, has led to a great deal of criticism
of the JFPA.

V. THE TCPA’S CURRENT IMPACT
The TCPA was a response to the “tens of thousands of unsolicited messages per week” being sent to fax machines throughout the country. 137 Since it was enacted, there has been a decline
in the number of junk fax complaints and unsolicited telemarketing phone calls. 138 This decline can be attributed to periods of increased protections, greater enforcement, and changing technologies.
A. The TCPA’s Relative Success
The TCPA has been relatively successful at reducing the
number of junk fax complaints and unwanted telemarketing
calls. Legitimate companies are largely deterred by the TCPA’s
private right of action. This, coupled with limited government enforcement, has perpetuated a dependency on the private right of
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Rules & Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 18 F.C.C. Rcd. 14014, 14128 ¶ 190 (July 3, 2003) (In fact, this
was the basis for removing the EBR. “Unlike the do-not-call list for telemarketing calls, Congress provided no mechanism for opting out of unwanted facsimile advertisements. Such an opt-out list would require the recipient to possibly bear the cost of the initial facsimile and inappropriately place the burden
on the recipient to contact the sender and request inclusion on a “do-not-fax”
list.”)(emphasis added).
135
See Jennifer A. Williams, Faxing It In, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 345, 375-76
(2006).
136
See Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991, Junk Fax Protection Act of 2005, 21 F.C.C. Rcd. 3787
(Apr. 6, 2006).
137
H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at 6-7 (1991).
138
Robert G. Gibbons & Lisa M. Ferri, Mail Control: Filtering Spam
Through a Mix of Technology, Legislation and the Courts, INTELL. PROP.
TODAY 8 (Dec. 2001).
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action. However, the government’s decision to implement the DoNot-Call Registry, and the period of increased enforcement by the
FCC from 2006-2008 demonstrate the positive impact that government involvement has on the success of TCPA regulation.
1. The Dependence on Private Attorney Generals
Private parties have largely been responsible for enforcement of the TCPA. This may be attributed to the significant incentive: the private right of action provides a relatively large
statutory damages amount, especially when compared to the “actual” harm in receiving a junk fax or unsolicited telemarketing
call. 139 Private parties may seek $500 per violation, which may be
trebled to $1500 per violation if the court determines that the defendant has “knowingly” or “willfully” violated the TCPA. 140 This
serves as a significant deterrent when coupled with the threat of a
class action.
A number of factors have created and perpetuated the
TCPA’s dependence on private enforcement. First, the statute
operates with limited government resources and a lack of urgency. The TCPA does not cover conduct that is particularly destructive or dangerous, 141 and although it continues to be adapted
and interpreted to cover newer technology, it also covers technology and conduct that some may consider outdated. 142 Consequently, it does not draw a great deal of attention from distracted
legislative bodies and government regulators that are already

06/02/2014 15:10:17
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139
David E. Sorkin, Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail and the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 1001 (Fall 1997) (for example, it is estimated that even in 1991, the most expensive faxes would only
cost about 10 cents per fax received); see also, e.g., A Bold Plan to End “Junk
Fax,” S.F. CHRON., Jan. 20, 1989; Peter Burrows, Bill Would Put Some Fax on
Hold, NEWSDAY, June 29, 1989, at 43; Destination Ventures, Ltd., v. FCC, 46
F.3d 54, 56 (9th Cir. 1995) (contrasting plaintiff’s estimate of 2 cents per page
with FCC’s claim of 3 to 40 cents); Carroll Lachnit, Electronic “Junk Mail”:
Judge Orders Fax Sender to Pay Businessman 22 Cents for Sending Unsolicited Ad, ORANGE COUNTY REG., July 3, 1991, at B8 (describing small claims
judgment of 22 cents for an unsolicited fax, apparently one page long).
140
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (2011).
141
CHARLES H. KENNEDY, THE BUSINESS PRIVACY LAW HANDBOOK
135 (2008) (“As privacy intrusions go, telemarketing calls cause little harm.
Telemarketers do not ruin reputations, steal identities, destroy data, or commit
any of the other destructive practices at which much of privacy law is aimed.”).
142
Paul Venezia, Why the Fax Machine Refuses to Die, INFOWORLD.COM
(Sept. 6, 2011, 3:00 AM), http://www.infoworld.com/d/data-center/why-thefax-machine-refuses-die-171308.
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stretched thin. Additionally, the process of government enforcement – when the FCC does become involved – is slow and limited.
Due to limited resources for government enforcement, dependence on the private right of action is unavoidable. Professor
J. Maria Glover argues that private regulation through litigation
is integral to the structure of the modern administrative state. 143
Private enforcement counters issues of limited agency resources,
especially where the focus of the regulation is something as unexciting (and as relatively innocuous) as prohibiting a fax advertising discount round-trip airfare and vacations to Las Vegas. 144
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See J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement
Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137 (2012).
144
Id. at 1155.
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As illustrated, it takes a number of steps before the FCC
even issues a citation, and, following a citation, forfeiture proceedings and monetary penalties will not be issued unless subsequent complaints are identified. If a forfeiture penalty is not paid,
the case is referred to the Department of Justice for collection.
Since the TCPA was enacted in 1991, the available data
demonstrates limited government enforcement. Only 1,082 citations have been issued since 1999. 146 Only thirty-nine 39 forfeiture
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145
GAO report (April 2006), Weaknesses in Procedures and Performance
Management
Hinder
Junk
Fax
Enforcement,
pg.
10,
http://www.gao.gov/assests/250/249596.pdf.
146
Unsolicited Faxes Detailed Information, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N,
transition.fcc.gov/eb/tcd/ufax.html (last updated Feb. 26, 2014).
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actions have been referred to the Department of Justice since
2005. 147 To place these numbers into greater context, in 2005 the
FCC received 47,704 complaints, 148 and issued just 23 citations. 149
The TCPA’s private right of action has proven a significant deterrent due to the statutory damages provision, the class
action mechanism, and the relative ease of establishing a TCPA
violation. The most notable example of the potential for enormous damages is a lawsuit that was filed in 2002 seeking $2.2 trillion against Fax.com (a fax broadcaster company). 150 In interviews with practitioners it became clear that TCPA class actions
are responsible for a significant increase in awareness of—and
compliance with—the TCPA. 151
Private lawsuits, coupled with limited government enforcement, have historically been successful under the TCPA.
However, the continued dependence on private attorneys general
may not continue to serve as a significant deterrent. Troubling
trends are emerging that seem to indicate the continued enforcement scheme may by inadequate to control “the ever-increasing
access through electronic means that advertisers have to consumers.” 152
2. The National Do Not Call Registry Reduced Unwanted
Telemarketing Calls
Since its implementation in 2003, the Do-Not-Call Registry (“DNCR”) has been immensely popular among consumers and
an effective tool in enforcing TCPA regulation. 153 According to
Information retrieved pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act Re-

148
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KRIS ANNE MORTEITH, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT
UNSOLICITED
FACSIMILE
ADVERTISING,
(Jan.
4,
2007),
http://transition.fcc.gov/eb/Orders/2007/DA-07-16A1.html (represents period
from July 9, 2005 through July 9, 2006).
149
Unsolicited Faxes Detailed Information, supra note 146.
150
Lawsuit Seeks $2.2 Trillion For Junk Faxes, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 23,
2002), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1030078343814272235.html.
151
Although, according to more than a few practitioners, this result has
been abused by some and represents, as mentioned above, “too strong a hammer for too little a harm” to those critics. Many of the practitioners interviewed
as part of this Report asked to remain anonymous. Copies of the confidential
memoranda submitted in response to the authors’ survey are on file with the
authors.
152
Critchfield Physical Therapy v. Taranto Grp., Inc., 263 P.3d 767, 774
(Kan. 2011).
153
Telemarketing Sales Rule, Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4580 (Jan. 29,
ON
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one survey, four years after the DNCR was implemented, over
72% of Americans had registered their numbers on the list. 154 As
shown in the chart below, registration grew exponentially in the
following years:

Figure 2 155
The DNCR was more than just popular; it was effective.
Telemarketers were generally no longer able to cold call consumers. 156 By registering their number on the list, consumers prevented the first call from a telemarketer – drastically reducing the
number of potential calls they could legally receive. 157
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2003) (codified at 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B) (2010)).
154
ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT TRANSMITTED TO THE
CONGRESS
JANUARY
2009
244
(2009),
available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ERP-2009/pdf/ERP-2009.pdf.
155
The authors compiled Figure 2 through reviewing the FTC Do Not
Call Registry Annual Reports for the years 2002-2003. The Annual Reports are
available on the FTC website, and for example, the FY2007 FTC Annual Report, available at http://.ftc.gov/reports/national-do-not-call-registry-annualreport-congress-fiscal-year-2007-pursuant-do-not-call, the FY2010 FTC Annual Report available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/national-do-not-callregistry-data-book-fiscal-year-2010.
156
The original Do-Not-Call Registry contained an “established business
relationship” exemption. The EBR exemption did, in fact, allow some telemarketers to make one call without fear of any liability so long as that telemarketer had an EBR with the recipient. Nevertheless, the Do-Not-Call Registry
drastically cut down on the amount of telemarketing calls that were legal before the Registry was enacted.
157
Telemarketing Sales Rule, Final Amended Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4580,
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By changing the regulation scheme of telemarketing solicitation from company-specific opt-out, to a “modified consentbased scheme,” 158 the FTC and FCC reduced the number of, and
complaints from, unsolicited telemarketing calls. A survey conducted less than a year after the Registry was implemented found
that registrants saw a reduction in telemarketing calls from “an
average of 30 calls per month to an average of 6 per month.” 159
According to a 2004 poll, 92% of those who signed up for the
Registry had received fewer telemarketing calls, and 25% of those
stated that they had received no telemarketing calls since signing
up. 160
3. Increased Government Enforcement Reduced Junk Fax
Complaints
From 2006-2008, the FCC increased enforcement of the
TCPA junk fax provisions and issued 738 citations 161 that resulted in 78 proposed monetary forfeitures. 162 Excluding these two
years, the FCC has proposed only 20 monetary forfeitures since
the implementation of the TCPA and issued just 1,082 citations
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C M
Y K

35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 23 Side B

4629 (Jan. 29, 2003) (codified at 16 C.F.R. § 310.4).
158
Michael R. Laudino, To Fax or Not to Fax: Analysis of the Regulations
and Potential Burdens Imposed by the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, 37
SETON HALL L. REV. 835, 859 (2007) (discussing the different approaches for
regulating junk fax, the author refers to a “modified consent” scheme that allows for certain “special situations” or relationships wherein a fax sender could
automatically send a fax to a recipient). Similarly, the EBR essentially created
a “modified consent” based scheme in that it allowed telemarketers to call consumers who had “consented” by purchasing goods from the seller or otherwise
meeting the definition of an EBR.
159
Economic Report of the President, 2009, p.244, Box 9-1, available at
http://www.nber.org/erp/2009_erp.pdf.
160
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Compliance with Do Not Call
Registry Exceptional: Over 55 Million Telephone Numbers Registered - Only
150,000 Complaints in
2003
(Feb. 13, 2004),
available at
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2004/02/compliance-do-not-callregistry-exceptional (citing Harris Interactive online poll conducted between
January 19 and 28, 2004, among 3,378 adults throughout the United States);
See also MONICA S. DESAI, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT ON
THE NATIONAL DO-NOT-CALL REGISTRY ¶ 9 (Sept. 16, 2005), available at
http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view;jsessionid=2Z2mPCWZYZlNy1PxWz
qdthL78p3QPyqZsKp16Q16pTDx3p1nhZQr!1471562840!321460796?id=6518162563.
161
Unsolicited Faxes Detailed Information, supra note 146.
162
Id.
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stemming from junk fax violations since 1999. 163

Figure 3 164
The cause of this increased enforcement may have been a
desire to respond to the rapid increase in junk fax complaints 165
or a result of increased congressional attention to junk fax regulation. 166 During this time, the FCC mainly targeted a few entities
that were responsible for multiple violations. For example,
Fax.com asserted that its database “exceed[ed] 30 million fax
numbers” 167 and was not the only fax broadcaster that existed
during that time. However, with a database of 30 million fax
numbers, it is easy to see how just a few companies could account
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Id.
Federal
Communications
Commission,
available
at
http://transition.fcc.gov/eb/tcd/ufax.html.
165
See infra Figure 4, Junk Fax Complaints Chart (In 2000, the FCC recorded 2,200 junk fax complaints. In 2005, the FCC recorded over 47,000).
166
The first amendment of the TCPA, the Junk Fax Prevention Act
(JFPA) of 2005, Pub. L.No. 109-21, 119 Stat. 359 (2005), was enacted in 2005.
The JFPA requires the FCC to submit an annual report on unsolicited fax advertisements. The FCC only issued this report once, in 2007.; See Annual report of Unsolicited Facsimile Advertisements (Rel. Jan. 4, 2007), available at
http://transition.fcc.gov/eb/Orders/2007/DA-07-16A1.html.
167
“In re Fax.com, Inc., File No. EB-02-TC-120, Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture (citing Broadcast your advertising fax based on radius, Zip
Codes, Metro Area, Area Code, County, State or the entire U.S. using a database
that
will
exceed
30
million
fax
numbers,
http://www.fax.com/Why_use_fax/direct.asp (website accessed May 29, 2002)”
available at http://transition.fcc.gove/eb/Orders/2002/FCC-02-226A1.html.
164
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for the majority of the junk fax violations.168 In 2007, the FCC
proposed forfeitures against three companies that totaled over
$4.7 million.169
From the graph below, one can see there was an exponential increase in the amount of junk fax complaints from the year
2000 until 2005. During and immediately after this enforcement
period, complaints declined. 170

Figure 4 171

168
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Id.
Unsolicited Faxes Detailed Information, supra note 146 (the three largest FCC proposed forfeitures in 2007 were filed against the following companies: The Hot Lead LLC ($2,168,500), Mexico Marketing, LLC ($1,133,000),
and Extreme Leads, Inc. ($1,377,000)).
170
Although correlation does not imply causation, the available data may
demonstrate that the FCC is much more able to tackle repeat, intentional offenders.
171
Federal
Communications
Commission,
http://transition.fcc.gov/eb/tcd/ufax.html.
172
David A. Mann, Attorney General Zoeller Vows Fight Over Junk Faxes,
Solicitors,
NEWS
AND
TRIBUNE
(Dec.
18,
2009),
http://newsandtribune.com/local/x546285000/Attorney-General-Zoeller-vowsfight-over-junk-faxes-solicitors/print.
169

35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 24 Side B

After 2008, the FCC took a step back and issued few citations. Some State Attorneys General have continued strong enforcement efforts in recent years. For instance, in 2009, Indiana
Attorney General Greg Zoeller filed 12 lawsuits over junk fax violations, and 24 lawsuits over telemarketing calls. 172 In the late
1990’s and early 2000’s, a number of State Attorneys General
brought actions against some of the largest violators of the
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TCPA; however, those lawsuits do not appear to correspond with
a decrease in the overall number of junk fax complaints, as was
seen with the 2006-2008 FCC enforcement era.
B. Changing Technology
The TCPA was enacted to respond to the changes in technology that allowed increased access to consumers; in 1991 it was
the fax machine. With the decline in junk faxes, the TCPA has
been adapted to address new technology that affects the privacy
interests of consumers. Today, the TCPA may properly be analyzed on the basis of its ability to effectively protect consumers’
cell phones.
1. Continued Importance of the TCPA Despite the Decline in
Fax Machine Use

173
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Id.
There are a plethora of companies offering computer-based fax services and fax to e-mail or e-mail to fax services to this day.
175
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 68 Fed. Reg. 44,144, 44,174 (July 25, 2003) (to be codified at
47 C.F.R. § 64 and 68).
176
Id.
174
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Although the traditional fax machine has seen a precipitous decline in use, faxes sent to personal computers and fax servers remain an important means of communication. 173 Unsolicited
advertisements, whether sent to a computer or fax server, shift
costs to the consumer. In 2003, the FCC concluded that unsolicited faxes, whether sent to a computer or fax server, still may “tie
up lines and printers so that the recipients’ requested faxes are
not timely received.” 174 If an advertisement is printed, recipients
bear the cost in the form of materials and increased labor costs, as
employees must sort out the junk messages. 175 This also presents
the risk that an important message may be inadvertently discarded while sifting through junk faxes.
The FCC concluded that “because a sender of a facsimile
message has no way to determine whether it is being sent to a
number associated with a stand-alone fax machine or to one associated with a personal computer or fax server, it would make little sense to apply different rules based on the device that ultimately received it.” 176 Further, “Congress could not have intended
to allow easy circumvention of its prohibition when faxes are (in-
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tentionally or not) transmitted to personal computers and fax
servers, rather than to traditional stand-alone facsimile machines.” 177
2. Cell Phones and the TCPA
There are two trends emerging with respect to cell phones
and the current impact of the TCPA: (1) over the past 5 years,
TCPA-related wireless complaints have steadily risen; and (2)
consumers are increasingly disconnecting their traditional residential landlines in favor of becoming cell phone-only households. Autodialed or prerecorded messages—or any telemarketing
solicitations for that matter—received on a cell phone present increased cost-shifting, safety, and privacy concerns. 178 These
trends demonstrate the importance of continued regulatory efforts to prevent illegal marketing phone calls to cell phones.
The FCC began recording complaints about TCPA violations experienced by consumers on their cell phones in the second
quarter of 2007, as seen in the chart below. 179 Included in this total number are complaints by wireless subscribers about “bill
shock,” “equipment related issues,” “service related issues,” and
177
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Rules & Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 68 Fed. Reg. 41,144, 44,170 (July 25, 2003) (compare the result
of sending an e-mail received as a text message discussed below, where the
sender (because of the e-mail address used) likely has knowledge that the email will be received as a text message).
178
See Shannon D. Torgerson, Getting Down to Business: How the Established Business Relationship Exemption to the National Do-Not-Call Registry
Forces Consumers to Pay for Unwanted Sales Calls, 3 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 24, ¶¶ 38-40 (Fall 2004) (“the very nature of mobile communication
technologies makes unsolicited sales calls to these devices more intrusive, inconvenient, and dangerous than similar calls made to stationary, landline residential phones.”).
179
The FCC has data on the number of TCPA complaints stemming from
violations experienced on consumers’ wireless phones from the first quarter of
2007. However, the first quarter of 2007 shows that there were 848 complaints
from TCPA violations experienced on cell phones. In the second quarter of
2007, there were 3164 such complaints. The FCC attributes this dramatic increase to a change in the form for reporting TCPA related complaints. The
new form, released sometime during the first quarter of 2007, was more detailed. The FCC noted there was a clear shift from “general” TCPA complaints, to more specific complaint types like “Wireless.” Information compiled
by the authors through reviewing the FCC Quarterly Report of Informal Consumer
Inquiries
and
Complaints
available
at
http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/quarterly-reports-consumer-inquiries-andcomplaints.
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“billing and rates.” TCPA related issues have been responsible for
about 75% of wireless-related complaints received by the FCC
over the past five years:

Figure 5 180
Since 2007, there has been a steady growth in both the total number of wireless complaints and the total number of TCPArelated wireless complaints recorded by the FCC. 181 As shown below, when compared to all TCPA-related complaints received by
the FCC, it is apparent that consumers are increasingly experiencing more unlawful conduct on their cell phones than by any
other media.
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FCC Annual Reports to Congress pursuant to Do-Not-Call Implementation Act. The authors compiled Figure 5 through reviewing the FCC Quarterly
Reports of Informal Consumer Inquiries and Complaints for fiscal years 20072012. The Quarterly Reports are available on the FCC, available at
http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/quarterly-reports-consumer-inquiries-andcomplaints.
181
Data from the fourth quarter of 2012 is not yet available. As a result, it
is not easily discernable whether the decrease in the total number of complaints in the third quarter of 2012 (from about 42,000 to 28,000) represents a
broader decreasing trend in the number of TCPA complaints, or is just a slight
anomaly.
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TCPA-Related Complaints Recorded by FCC (Quarterly 2009-2012)

Figure 6 182
This data does not necessarily mean that telemarketers are
intentionally targeting consumers on their cell phones. The increase in the number of TCPA-related wireless complaints corresponds with an overall increase in the number of cell phone subscribers:
June 1997

June 2002

June 2007

June 2012

48.7M 184

134.6M

243.4M

321.7M

N/A

N/A

10.5%

34%

Wireless Subscriber
Connections 183

Figure 7

186

182
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Supra note 180.
CTIA, Semi-Annual Wireless Industry Survey (June 2012),
http://www.ctia.org/advocacy/research/index.cfm/aid/10316 (in June 2011, 306
million US subscribers).
184
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov. (Interestingly, the U.S.
population is around 311 million).
185
Stephen J. Blumberg, et al., Wireless Substitution: Early Release of Estimates from the National Health Interview Survey, 2010-2011, 61 National
Health Statistics Report (Oct. 12, 2012),
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr061.pdf.
186
Authors compiled CTIA WIRELESS SURVEY, 186 U.S. Census Bureau,
http://www.census.gov. (Interestingly, the U.S. population is around 311 million), and Stephen J. Blumberg, et al., Wireless Substitution: Early Release of
Estimates from the National Health Interview Survey, 2010-2011, 61 National
183
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As a consequence of a larger total amount of active cell
phones, an increase in the amount of TCPA-related wireless
complaints was expected. As cell phone use increases (and the
percentage of cell phone-only households also increases) certain
telemarketing practices will become even more invasive. 187 The
greater number of calls received on a cell phone increases the
likelihood that those calls will be received at a dangerous time
(e.g., while driving a car).
The effectiveness of the TCPA ultimately will be defined
by its ability to protect consumers’ cell phones. The need for continued regulation is supported by the increase in TCPA-related
wireless complaints over the past five years, the increase in the
overall number of cell phones (and percentage of cell phone-only
households), and the result of consumers’ willingness to bring cell
phones everywhere (and the potential for danger in doing so).

VI. THREE ISSUES AFFECTING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
THE TCPA
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Y K
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Health
Statistics
Report
(Oct.
12,
2012),
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr061.pdf.
187
See Shannon D. Torgerson, Getting Down to Business: How the Established Business Relationship Exemption to the National Do-Not-Call Registry
Forces Consumers to Pay for Unwanted Sales Calls, 3 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 24, ¶¶ 38-40 (Fall 2004) (“the very nature of mobile communication
technologies makes unsolicited sales calls to these devices more intrusive, inconvenient, and dangerous than similar calls made to stationary, landline residential phones.”).
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The TCPA remains relevant because it stems the tide of
abusive and intrusive conduct that would otherwise occur, and,
despite changing technology, remains justified by its original
purpose of preventing cost-shifting and protecting privacy. A
number of emerging trends and technology present a challenge
going forward.
First, the majority of entities in violation of the TCPA and
other telemarketing laws today are doing so intentionally. These
entities are often based offshore and use technology to their advantage to avoid being detected. Second, the current public enforcement and application of the TCPA is increasingly inadequate to regulate intentional violators. Lastly, advances in
technology, most notably cellphones and text messaging, require
adaptation of the TCPA.
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A. New Types of TCPA Violators
The entities responsible for the majority of TCPA violations can generally be placed in one of two camps: (1) those that
unknowingly or unintentionally violate the TCPA; 188 and (2)
those that intentionally violate the TCPA. Within each of those
two camps, there are subsets that more accurately describe those
that have violated the regulation. For example, one subset of intentional violators are those actively looking to commit fraud; 189
whereas another subset may do so simply because it is the most
cost-effective way to advertise.
Data collected by the FTC and FCC indicates that the
number of entities operating in intentional disregard of the TCPA
appears to be on the rise. This is illustrated by two facts: (1) the
total number of entities that are paying to access the Do-Not-Call
Registry is decreasing; and (2) the number of telemarketing complaints has been rapidly growing over the past few years.

188
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See Yuri R. Linetsky, Protection of “Innocent Lawbreakers”: Striking
the Right Balance in the Private Enforcement of the Anti- “Junk Fax” Provisions of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 90 NEB. L. Rev. 70, 91, n. 133
(2011).
189
See Sid Kircheimer, Stop Spam Text Messages, AARP BULLETIN (Oct.
3, 2012), http://www.aarp.org/money/scams-fraud/info-10-2012/stop-spamtext-messages.html (quoting Cloudmark study) (There is evidence to suggest
those sending unsolicited text message advertisements are the largest proportion of this group).
190
The authors compiled Figure 8 by reviewing the FTC’s National DoNot-Call Registry Data Books. The Data Books may be found on the FTC
website, and for example, the FY2013 Data Book available at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/national-do-not-call-
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The fact that fewer entities are paying for access to the
Do-Not-Call Registry suggests that the number of legitimate entities engaged in telemarketing is on the decline. This is further
supported by the decrease in telemarketers as defined and
tracked by the Bureau of Labor Statistics over the past several
years:

Figure 9 191
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Statistics,
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registry-data-book-fiscal-year-2013/131204dncdatabook.pdf.
191
Bureau
of
Labor
http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes419041.htm.
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Despite this decline in the number of telemarketers, there
has been an exponential increase in the number of consumer
complaints recorded by the FTC in recent years.
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Figure 10 192

B. Enforcement and Application of the TCPA is Increasingly
Inadequate
Enforcement of the TCPA is complicated by changing
technology. Increasingly, those responsible for TCPA violations
are located outside the U.S. or are using the Internet to complete
calls. 194 According to the FTC, about 59% of phone spam cannot
192

Supra not 187.
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Announces Agenda for Robocall Summit on October 18, 2012 (Oct. 04, 2012), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/10/robocalls.shtm.
194
Lauren Silverman, FTC Offers $50,000 Reward to Help Stop Robocalls,
NPR (Jan. 02, 2013), www.npr.org/2013/01/02/168444025/reward-offered-to-
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It is reasonable to suggest that the increased complaint
level is a result of an increase in the number of entities that are intentionally violating the TCPA. The FTC recently found that
“[c]onsumers are getting more robocalls than ever. Technology is
ultimately to blame: Companies are using autodialers that can
send out thousands of phone calls every minute for an incredibly
low cost.” 193
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be traced or blocked because the phone calls are routed through
“a web of automatic dialers, caller ID spoofing and voice-overInternet protocols.” 195 According to one staff member of the FTC,
“you can track down one source of the calls, but there are likely
hundreds of others now using the same type of recording.” 196
The traditional scheme of TCPA enforcement has reflected a strong reliance on the private right of action and a limited
amount of government involvement. Although that scheme has
been relatively successful in the past, two main issues are becoming clear: (1) the private right of action is limited in both incentivizing lawsuits against, and deterring the actions of, intentional violators; and (2) the current FCC enforcement mechanism fails to
yield timely results.
The private right of action has been most effective at enforcing and deterring prohibited conduct of otherwise legitimate
companies. The ever-growing population of intentional violators
presents a new challenge. When TCPA violators are located overseas 197 or are judgment proof, there is little incentive for an individual or class of private plaintiffs to bring a lawsuit. The effort
becomes futile when the violator cannot even be located.
The FCC’s enforcement process for violations of the
TCPA is inherently slow. This process relies on consumer complaints that accrue over time and the process requires a number
of steps before meaningful action is taken. During this time, the
violator may continue to operate while escaping actual enforcement. For example, consider the following FCC enforcement action concerning one junk fax violation:

06/02/2014 15:10:17
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help-stop-robocalls.
195
Nelson, supra note 2.
196
David Lazarus, Do-not-call list is almost like a feel-free-to-call-anytime list, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2012), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-filazarus-20120928,0,3063900.column (quoting Roberto Anguizola, FTC Assistant Director of Marketing Practices).
197
See Federal Trade Commission v. Asia Pacific Telecom, Inc., 788 F.
Supp. 2d 779 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (defendants violated the Telemarketing Act by
repeatedly making illegal telemarketing calls. The defendant corporations had
as their principal places of business: Kowloon, Hong Kong; Almere, Netherlands, and the Northern Marina Islands).
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Figure 11 198
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198
Five Star Advertising, Inc., No. EB-07-TC-13323 (Fed. Commc’ns
Comm’n
Jan.
5,
2012),
available
at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-12-2A1.pdf.
199
Transcript of Robocalls: All the Rage, An FTC Summit at 184-86 (Oct.
18,
2012),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/robocalls-allrage-ftc-summit/robocallsummittranscript.pdf (Eric Bash, Associate Bureau
Chief, FCC Enforcement Bureau).
200
Id.
201
FED. TRADE COMM’N, ADDITIONAL REPORT TO CONGRESS,
PURSUANT TO THE DO NOT CALL REGISTRY FEE EXTENSION ACT OF 2007 6
(Dec.
2009),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/additional-reportcongress-pursuant-do-not-call-registry-fee-extension-act-
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Under the Communications Act, the FCC is required to
utilize this enforcement process, and unlike the FTC or a State
Attorney General, the FCC does not have the power to go directly
into federal court to seek an injunction.199 The FCC is allowed
only to issue a citation (i.e., a warning) to entities that do not hold
FCC licenses “[. . .] to alert this entity that may not typically be
[. . .] aware that it is operating in a regulated space that the FCC
is involved in [. . .]” 200
The FCC’s Enforcement Bureau issued over 1,000 citations to Do-Not-Call Registry violators from 2003 until 2009. 201
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However, the FCC only issued five Notices of Apparent Liability,
resulting in only two forfeiture orders addressing Do-Not-Call violations during that same time period. 202 If the FCC continues to
proceed at this pace, its enforcement of the TCPA will be almost
entirely ineffective.
CASE STUDY #1: Security First of Alabama, LLC
Security First was issued a citation by the FCC on November 26,
2008, for delivering unsolicited, prerecorded advertising messages.
In accordance with 503(b)(5) of the Communications Act, Security
First was given 30 days to respond to the citation in the form of either requesting an interview with the FCC, or providing a statement responding to the citation. Security First did not respond to
the citation.
The complaints about continued to roll in. Security First’s conduct began affecting more than just consumers. From late 2010 until mid-2011, a company called A.V.P.S. Incorporated, located in
Tempe, Arizona was being “bombarded with angry callers.”1 The
reason: Security First had “spoofed” its caller ID so that A.V.P.S.’s
telephone number was displayed on consumer caller ID displays
when Security First made its telemarketing calls.1

This Notice of Apparent Liability was issued on April 14, 2011;
two and a half years after the FCC first issued the citation. This did
nothing to stop Security First’s operations. Moreover, based upon
Security First’s decision to ignore the initial FCC citation, and a re-
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2007/100104dncadditionalreport.pdf.
202
Id.
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From the complaints it received, the FCC found that Security
First sent 43 unsolicited, prerecorded advertising messages to 33
consumers.1 Hundreds of other illegal calls were probably made to
other individuals, yet went unreported.1 Security First’s conduct in
(1) calling phone numbers registered on the National Do-Not-Call
Registry,1 (2) providing an opt-out telephone number in the prerecorded message that was always busy or disconnected, (3) failing to
honor do-not-call requests that were made, and (4) deliberately
“spoofing” its caller ID,1 led the FCC to conclude that Security
First was a “particularly egregious distributor of prohibited prerecorded messages.”1 As a consequence, the FCC issued a Notice of
Apparent Liability to Security First in the amount of $342,000.1
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fusal to respond to a civil lawsuit resulting in a default judgment, it
is likely that they will also ignore the Notice of Apparent Liability. 203

After the FCC receives a junk fax complaint, it records the
complaint on an enforcement spreadsheet. 204 Historically, the
FCC had issues with consumers not providing all the information
needed for the agency to go forward with tracking a violation or
pursuing enforcement. In 2005, about 60% of the junk fax complaints did not include an attachment of the fax, and “therefore,
under [the FCC Enforcement Bureau’s practice], would not have
been included in the FCC’s enforcement spreadsheet. As a result,
the FCC would not have included these complaints in searches
for major alleged violators or repeat offenders or considered them
in decisions about investigation or enforcement.” 205
The FCC’s reliance on consumer complaints has limited
its enforcement in the past. However, this weakness will further
be exposed by increases in technology that makes it difficult for
consumers to identify violators. A new enforcement process is
necessary for effective TCPA enforcement.
C. Advances in Technology Require Adaptation

203
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Citation from Kurt A. Schroeder, Deputy Chief, Telecommunications
Consumers Division, Enforcement Bureau, File No. EB-08-TC-6825 (November 26, 2008), fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-11-61A1.pdf; Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, In the Matter of Security First of Alabama, LLC, EB-08-TC-6825 ¶ 3 (Apr. 14, 2011); Gary Harper, FCC
crackdown on telemarketer that harassed Tempe business, AZFAMILY.COM
(May 10, 2011), http://www.azfamily.com/news/consumer/FCC-Cracks-DownOn-Telemarketer-That-Harrassed-Tempe-Business-121574534.html;
47
C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2) (2011); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1401(e) (2011); Monitronics Funding LP v. Security First of Alabama, LLC, No. 3-08-CV-333, 2008 WL 4367296
(N.D. Tex. 2008).
204
See UNITED STATES GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-425,
WEAKNESSES IN PROCEDURES AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT HINDER
JUNK
FAX
ENFORCEMENT
(2006),
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/249596.pdf.
205
Id.
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Advances in technology have guided interpretations and
amendment of the statute since its enactment in 1991. Currently,
the growth in text message spam and identification-spoofing
technology present the greatest challenges. The current focus on
identification requirements must be reconsidered, as new technology has made it easier to deceive consumers and ignore the re-
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quirements with impunity.
1. Growing Concern Over Text Message Spam
Over the last decade there has been an exponential increase in the amount of cell phone subscribers, 206 text messaging, 207 and text message spam. A report by Forrester Research
Inc. indicated that in 2003, just 17% of U.S. cell phone customers
were sending text messages. 208 By 2011, 6 billion text messages
were sent each day, 209 with text messaging users sending or receiving an average of 35 messages per day. 210 As it becomes easier
to reach consumers on cell phones, spammers will change their
practices accordingly 211 and a continued increase in text message
spam seems inevitable.
Under the TCPA 212 and the CAN-SPAM Act, 213 sending
text message spam is illegal. However, consumers received about
4.5 billion spam text messages in 2011, up from 2.2 billion received in 2009. 214 Text message spam is also a major concern for
206
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Michael O’Grady, SMS Usage Remains Strong in the US, FORRESTER
RESEARCH (June 19, 2012), http://blogs.forrester.com/michael_ogrady/12-0619sms_usage_remains_strong_in_the_us_6_billion_sms_messages_are_sent_each
_day (According to Forrester Research, 80% of the U.S. population owns a
mobile phone).
207
Id. (70% of mobile phone owners regularly send or receive text messages, according to Forrester Research.).
208
Wendy Tanaka, Cell Phones New Target of Spammers, CHI. TRIB. (July
10,
2004),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2004-0710/business/0407100257_1_cell-phone-text-messaging-internet-spam.
209
O’Grady, supra note 204.
210
Id.
211
Olga Kharif, Spam Texts Hit 4.5 Billion, Raising Consumer Ire, S.F.
CHRON. (Apr. 30, 2012), http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Spam-textshit-4-5-billion-raising-consumer-ire-3520012.php (quoting Greg Goldfarb, a
managing director at Summit Partners, “Bad actors will go to the biggest installed base worldwide. The volume of abuse that comes to people around me
has increased 50 times in the last 18 months.”).
212
Rules & Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 18 F.C.C. Rcd. 14014, ¶ 165 (July 3, 2003) (Indicating that the
TCPA’s “ban on autodialers encompasses both voice and text calls, including
short message service (SMS) calls.”).
213
Joffe v. Acacia Mortgage Corp., 121 P. 3d 831, 841 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2005) (citing Rules and Regulations Implementing the CAN-SPAM Act of
2003 and the TCPA, 19 FCC Rcd. 15927, 15933 (2004)).
214
Nicole Perlroth, Spam Invades a Last Refuge, the Cellphone, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/08/technology/textmessage-spam-difficult-to-stop-is-a-growing-menace.html?_r=0 (citing Ferris
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wireless telephone providers. 215 In 2004, a spokesman for Verizon
Wireless indicated that, at that point, wireless companies had
been somewhat successful at “beating back” the potential onslaught of text message spam, but noted that “like your home
computer, there are some that get through.” 216
The widespread use of cell phone technology has provided
spammers with a cost effective way to reach millions of consumers. In 2004, a report noted that it was expensive to send cell
phone spam: “most carriers charge between 8 and 12 cents per
message, while sending spam over the Internet is virtually
free.” 217 Today, spammers are able to send millions of texts at a
low cost using basic technology. For example, in 2011 the FTC
stopped a man after he had sent more than 5.5 million spam text
messages – a rate of about 85 text messages per minute, every minute over a period of 40 days. 218
Like faxes, text messages arrive automatically. Consumers
may respond to messages by writing ‘OPT-OUT’ or ‘STOP,’
however, this confirms that the spammer has reached an active
phone number. 219 In the case mentioned above, the defendant advertised mortgage modification services and encouraged consumers to visit his website, “loanmod-gov.net.” 220 By responding
‘STOP’ or by visiting his website and filling out a form, the defendant collected consumers’ information and then sold that information to marketers claiming they were “debt settlement
leads.” 221
The technology associated with text message spam pre-
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Research study).
215
Press Release, AdaptiveMobile, 14.2 Million Brits Bombarded By SMS
Spam, (Nov. 22, 2012) [hereinafter AdaptiveMobile Press Release], available at
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20121122005014/en/14.2-millionBrits-bombarded-SMS-spam#.Uz76zlehHHo (indicating that, in Great Britain,
“29% of those that received text spam claim that they would leave their operator if they received between 11 and 30 spam text messages a month.” It is reasonable to assume that tolerance in the United States would be at a much lower level (meaning consumers would switch carriers much sooner), given the
current low amount of text message spam received by Americans in comparison to their British counterparts.).
216
Tanaka, supra note 206.
217
Id.
218
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Asks Court to Shut Down
Text Messaging Spammer (Feb. 23, 2011) [hereinafter FTC Text Messaging
Press Release], available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/02/loan.shtm.
219
AdaptiveMobile Press Release, supra note 213.
220
FTC Text Messaging Press Release, supra note 216.
221
Id.

35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 32 Side A

06/02/2014 15:10:17

Waller Article4.docx (Do Not Delete)

2014

5/21/2014 2:30 PM

The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991

397

sents an even greater harm. Consumers may accidentally sign up
for a “bogus, impossible-to-cancel service” simply by clicking on a
link in a text message. 222 Another text message scam encourages
consumers to “claim a Walmart Gift Card,” 223 or similar reward,
it then directs its victims to a website called “walmartgift.mobi,” 224 or a similar deceptively named site. At the site, consumers are then required to enter in their personal information,
including credit card numbers or social security numbers. 225 This
increasingly common practice has come to be known as “smishing.” 226 According to a study by Cloudmark, a company that
makes anti-spam software, 70% of all text message spam is designed to defraud the recipient in some way. 227
It is often difficult to discover the origin of text message
spam. As with telemarketing calls, spammers have learned how
to evade identification. 228 As a result, it is exceedingly difficult to
locate offenders, which frustrates the efforts of private plaintiffs
attempting to enforce the TCPA.
2. Congress Should Reconsider “Identification” Requirements
In 2010, the TCPA was amended by the Truth in Caller
ID Act (“TCIDA”), which made it illegal to “knowingly transmit
misleading or inaccurate caller identification information with
the intent to defraud, cause harm, or wrongfully obtain anything
of value.” 229 Unlike most of the TCPA, the TCIDA is not enforceable by private parties. Additionally, the language of the TCIDA
focuses on fraudulent conduct. Unfortunately, the identification
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Perlroth, supra note 212 (quoting Christine Todaro, FTC attorney).
Claes Bell, Walmart Warns of Text Message Scam, BANKRATE.COM
(May
24,
2012,
10:00
AM),
http://www.bankrate.com/financing/banking/walmart-warns-of-text-messagescam.
224
Id.
225
Id.
226
Similar to “phishing” with respect to e-mail spam, the practice is called
“smishing” because text messages are also known as short message service
messages, or SMS.
227
Kircheimer, supra note 186 (Only 10% of e-mail spam is sent with
fraudulent intent).
228
Eric A. Taub, Eluding A Barrage of Spam Text Messages, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 4, 2012, at B9 (Discussing self-help available for consumers concerning
spam text messages: “Which is why when I recently tried to call back the
phone number that sent the payday loan offer (via text), a recording stated that
‘the number you dialed is not a working number.”).
229
47 U.S.C. § 227(e) (2011).
223
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requirements provided by the statute are insufficient.
An outright ban on caller ID manipulating technology
would be inappropriate because there are a number of benign
and even beneficial reasons for doing so. For example, a Caller
ID display with the calling party identified as “Verizon Wireless”
is much more meaningful to a consumer than a display showing
Verizon’s legal name, “Cellco Partnership.” 230 In reviewing the
comments received from the public, the FCC noted that there are
a “variety of legitimate reasons for altering caller ID information.” 231 For example, “doctors responding to after hours messages from their patients or other medical providers may want to
use their cell phones to return the calls, but choose to transmit
their office number rather than their cell phone number as the
calling number.” 232 Consequently, caller ID-modifying technology
may be beneficial both to consumers (who screen calls) and businesses (that wish to have consumers call back at a certain number).
Spoofing caller ID has gained more notoriety for its illegitimate (and now illegal) use. While spoofing technology has been
used to prank the recipient, 233 it is increasingly used to encourage
consumers to pick up the phone. 234 A spoofed caller ID display
may be designed to enable a telemarketer to deliver a truthful
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230
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Concerning Caller Identification,
(Fed.
Trade
Comm’n
Jan.
28,2011),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_comments/16-cfr-part310-telemarketing-sales-rule-00044%C2%A0/00044-57517.pdf (comments of
Verizon and Verizon Wireless).
231
Caller
ID
spoofing,
WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caller_ID_spoofing (last modified Apr. 1, 2014,
5:55 PM) (“Valid reasons to spoof caller ID”).
232
In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Truth in
Caller ID Act of 2009, FCC 11-100, pg. 4-5 (June 20, 2011) (citing PRC Reply
at
3;
DOJ
Reply
at
4-5)
available
at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/eduocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-11-100A1/pdf.
233
LAPD on Guard After Tom Cruise, Chris Brown ‘Swatting’ Incidents,
L.A.
TIMES
(Jan.
22,
2013,
4:04
PM),
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2013/01/lapd-on-guard-after-tom-cruisechris-brown-swatting-incidents.html.
234
Matt Richtel, Who’s on the Line? Increasingly, Caller ID is Duped,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/23/us/whos-onthe-line-increasingly-caller-id-is-duped.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
(“Telemarketers increasingly are disguising their real identities and phone numbers
to provoke people to pick up the phone. ‘Humane Soc.’ may not be the Humane Society. And think the I.R.S. is on the line? Think again. Caller ID, in
other words, is becoming fake ID.”).
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pitch, or to get a debtor to answer the phone. Both examples may
be frustrating to consumers, but may be of little actual harm.
The issue with the TCIDA’s identification requirements is
two-fold. First, technology enabling individuals and entities to
spoof their identification is cheap and readily available. 235 Second, individuals that intend to deceive others or otherwise commit fraud are unlikely to be deterred by regulations that require
them to provide truthful identification. As a result, identification
requirements are difficult to enforce and may have little practical
effect.
The TCPA has required sender identification for fax
transmissions 236 and prerecorded and autodialed messages 237 since
1992, but that has not stopped companies from delivering
callback numbers that do not lead back to the telemarketer making the phone call. To further illustrate this point, consider spam
e-mail, which is regulated under the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003. 238
CAN-SPAM, makes it (1) a crime to send unsolicited commercial
e-mails containing fraudulent header information; 239 (2) prohibits
the transmission of spam to individuals that have opted out of receiving further communications from the sender; 240 and (3) requires certain identification information be included in all com-

235
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For example, the company SpoofCard offers 60 minutes of calls with a
spoofed caller ID for $9.95.
236
47 C.F.R. § 68.318(c)(3) (1998) (“It shall be unlawful for any person
within the United States to use a computer or other electronic device to send
any message via a telephone facsimile machine unless such message clearly
contains, in a margin at the top or bottom of each transmitted page or on the
first page of the transmission, the date and time it is sent and an identification
of the business, other entity, or individual sending the message and the telephone number of the sending machine or of such business, other entity, or individual. Telephone facsimile machines manufactured on and after December
20, 1992 must clearly mark such identifying information on each transmitted
message.”). Today, fax machine identification requirements are located at 47
C.F.R. § 68.318(d)).
237
47 C.F.R., §§ 64, 68: 64.1200(e)(iv) (1998) (“A person or entity making a
telephone solicitation must provide the called party with the name of the individual caller, the name of the person or entity on whose behalf the call is being
made, and a telephone number or address at which the person or entity may be
contacted. If a person or entity makes a solicitation using an artificial or prerecorded voice message transmitted by an autodialer, the person or entity must
provide a telephone number other than that of the autodialer or prerecorded
message player which placed the call.”).
238
CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7701-7713 (West Supp. 2004).
239
18 U.S.C.A. § 1037 (West Supp. 2004).
240
15 U.S.C.A. § 7704(a)(4).
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mercial e-mail. 241 As with spoofing caller ID, the practice of sending unsolicited commercial e-mail is legal, so long as the practice
adheres to certain requirements.
In 2003, when CAN-SPAM was enacted, spam comprised
nearly 60% of all e-mail traffic. 242 In 2010, it was estimated that
88% of worldwide e-mail traffic was spam. 243 CAN-SPAM has
had a limited effect on unsolicited commercial e-mail. Much of
“spamming activity was already illegal, including the sale of
counterfeit goods infringing on trademarks and intellectual property rights, or pharmaceuticals that are illegal to dispense without
a prescription in many jurisdictions (or even to ship across state
lines to a consumer with a valid prescription).” 244 Additional regulations fail to deter those already acting illegally.
Regulation of spoofing caller ID – like regulation of spam
– targets conduct that is most likely part of a larger overall
scheme to defraud or scam individuals, conduct that is already illegal. Additionally, individuals or entities that are spoofing caller
ID are just as likely to be located overseas as those individuals or
entities flooding inboxes with spam.
This is not to say that regulation of such conduct is unnecessary. To the contrary, it is important to have legislation in place
that clearly regulates the use of caller ID manipulation, spam email, and the like. These laws deter legitimate companies that
would otherwise engage in this intrusive conduct, and consumers
are better protected as a result. However, it seems evident that,
with respect to those that are determined to act illegally, an additional technical regulation will do little to stop them.

Today, the TCPA remains a relevant statute as advances
in technology continue to lead to “ever-increasing access through
electronic means that advertisers have to consumers.” 245 The
241
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15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7704(a)(3), (a)(5).
Jonathan Krim, Senate Votes 97-0 to Restrict E-Mail Ads: Bill Could
Lead to No-Spam Registry, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2003, at A1; see also Adam
Zitter, Good Laws for Junk Fax? Government Regulation of Unsolicited Solicitations, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2767, 2822 (2004).
243
Justin M. Rao and David H. Reily, The Economics of Spam, 26 J. OF
ECON. PERSPECTIVES 87 (Summer 2012).
244
Id.
245
Critchfield Physical Therapy v. Taranto Grp., Inc., 263 P.3d 767, 774
242
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TCPA’s private right of action serves as an effective deterrent in
curtailing the conduct of legitimate companies.
While consumers have been protected from some of the intrusive conduct targeted by the TCPA, there are a number of
steps that should be taken to increase the effectiveness of the
statute. The FCC enforcement process takes too long. Consumers
would be better served by a quicker, more transparent process.
Additionally, efforts at educating consumers about existing regulation and how to recognize scams or frauds would also go a long
way in reducing the impact of TCPA violations.
A. Increase Government Enforcement of the TCPA
Government enforcement is critical to the success of the
TCPA. In the past, private parties have represented the majority
of TCPA enforcement, and the private right of action still serves
as a significant deterrent. Nevertheless, there is a growing necessity for government enforcement actions due to a considerable
rise in the amount of intentional violators. The case study below
provides an illustration of the current shortcomings of government enforcement.
CASE STUDY #2: Fax.com

(Kan. 2011).
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While private lawsuits piled up, government regulators slowly intervened. In 2002, the FCC had proposed
forfeiture against Fax.Com for TCPA violations. In conjunction with the proposed forfeiture, the FCC issued
over 100 citations and letters of inquiry to companies
that used Fax.Com’s service to send fax advertisements.

35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 34 Side A

From 2000-2005, Fax.Com was subject of numerous of
lawsuits filed across the country. The most notable was
a lawsuit filed in California in 2002 seeking $2.2 trillion
in damages. At least one of these lawsuits was successful in securing a final judgment. However, it quickly
became clear to the members of Covington & Burling
(the plaintiff’s firm) that Fax.Com’s goal was to draw
out the litigation while it continued to send illegal faxes.
One year after being hit with a $2.3 million judgment,
Fax.com was still sending as many as 785,000 faxes per
week.
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However, even after the citations and proposed forfeiture, Fax.Com continued on with the illegal practices.
In July 2003, the Attorney General for the State of California then filed a lawsuit against the company, seeking
more than $15 million in penalties and other relief. According to then-California Attorney General Bill Lockyer, “Fax.Com, with high-level technology and low-level
respect for the law, runs a 24-hour privacy invasion operation that continually spews unsolicited faxes and prerecorded phone calls.” In January 2004, the FCC imposed the previously proposed forfeiture, a $5.4 million
penalty, the largest single fine ever imposed for violation of the TCPA. In spring 2004, an injunction was issued in the case filed by the California Attorney General, mandating that Fax.Com and its surrogates refrain
from sending junk faxes. With a valid injunction issued,
Fax.Com finally agreed to stop.
The Fax.Com case study demonstrates the difficulty and
time it takes to stop an entity that is determined to violate the
TCPA. The imposition of fines and valid judgments in excess of
$7 million did little to deter Fax.Com’s conduct. It was likely the
threat of criminal prosecution (which would result if the injunction was violated) that coerced the company to stop its practice of
sending unsolicited fax advertisements. 246
246

06/02/2014 15:10:17

C M
Y K

35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 34 Side B

See, e.g., Kaufman v. ACS Sys., Inc., 110 Cal. App. 4th 886, 2 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 296 (2003); Aronson v. Fax.com Inc., No. AR00-003023, 2001 WL
1202609 (Pa. Ct. Common Pleas Feb. 28, 2001); Morris v. Fax.com, No. 03CA-1109 (D.C. Super. Ct. 2003); Levitt v. Fax.com, Inc., 383 Md. 141, 857
A.2d 1089 (2004); Rudgayzer & Gratt v. Enine, Inc., 4 Misc. 3d 4, 779 N.Y.S.2d
882, 884 (N.Y. App. Term 2004); Bruns v. E-Commerce Exch., Inc., 51 Cal.
4th 717, 722, 248 P.3d 1185, 1188 (2011); McGarry v. Cingular Wireless, LLC,
267 Ga. App. 23, 599 S.E.2d 34, 35 (2004); Hanna Campbell & Powell, LLP v.
Fax.com, Inc., No. CV 2002-12-6926, 2003 WL 25696634 (Ohio Ct. Common
Pleas 2003); Redefining Progress v. Fax.Com, Inc., No. C 02-4057 MJJ, 2003
WL 926853 (N.D. Cal. 2003); Covington & Burling v. Int’l Mktg. & Research,
Inc., No. CIV.A. 01-0004360, 2003 WL 21384825 (D.C. Super. Ct. 2003); Ryan
Singel, Fax.com Still Dodging Legal Slaps, WIRED.COM (Jan. 1, 2004),
http://www.wired.com/techbiz/media/news/2004/01/61861?currentPage=all
(quoting Jason Levine, an attorney at Covington & Burling, “During the course
of our litigation, it became clear very quickly that Fax.com was very skilled at
using the legal system to draw out the length of time that lawsuits against it
would be pending.”); Unsolicited Faxes Detailed Information, supra note 146
(“$5,379,000 forfeiture proposed against Fax.com, Inc. for violations of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act.”); Press Release, Fed. Comm’ns
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Fax.Com was a company originally based in California,
and private parties did not have difficulty locating the company.
Unfortunately, the companies that are increasingly responsible
for the majority of TCPA violations are located overseas. With
respect to telemarketing solicitations, David Vladeck, Director of
the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection has said, “These are
not like the calls we grew up with . . . They are computer-blasted
calls that are enabled by the Internet. The dialers are outside the
U.S. generally, and these dialers are capable of blasting out an
unfathomable number of telephone calls.” 247
Government enforcement is necessary. Private parties do
not possess the resources or the incentive to track and locate entities located outside the United States. Even for companies located
within the United States, such as the individual that the FTC
prohibited from sending text messages to millions of people, private parties may lack an incentive to bring an enforcement action
against them because (for private parties) a judgment is meaningless without the ability to recover damages.
B. Aiding FCC Enforcement Efforts: Expanding Authority and
Increasing Incentive

C M
Y K
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Comm’n, FCC Proposes $5,379,000 Fine Against Fax.Com, Inc. for Violating
“Junk
Fax”
Prohibition
(Aug.7,
2002),
available
at
http://transition.fcc.gov/eb/News_Releases/DOC-225128A1.html; Press Release, Office of the Attorney General, State of California Department of Justice, Attorney General Lockyer Files Lawsuit Against One of Nation’s Largest
Junk Fax Businesses (July 22, 2003), available at https://oag.ca.gov/news/pressreleases/attorney-general-lockyer-files-lawsuit-against-one-nations-largestjunk-fax; Press Release, Fed. Comm’ns Comm’n, FCC fines fax.com over $5
million for sending “junk faxes” (Jan. 5, 2004), available at
http://transition.fcc.gov/eb/News_Releases/DOC-242654A1.html;
Scott
Hovanyetz, Fax.com Accepts Injunction, DMNEWS.COM (Oct. 11, 2004),
http://www.dmnews.com/faxcom-accepts-injunction/article/85570/.
247
Lauren Silverman, FTC Offers $50,000 Reward to Help Stop Robocalls,
NPR (Jan. 02, 2013), www.npr.org/2013/01/02/168444025/reward-offered-tohelp-stop-robocalls.
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The FCC is the only federal agency currently able to bring
enforcement actions against TCPA violators. State Attorneys
General also have this ability, but must generally defer to the
FCC enforcement process. Several statutory amendments to the
TCPA may increase the amount and effectiveness of government
enforcement actions, including: (1) increasing penalties per violation; (2) enabling the FCC to dispense with its typical enforcement procedure; and (3) enabling the FTC to bring enforcement
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actions against TCPA violators.
Increasing the penalties per violation for government
agencies would encourage more government action by both the
FCC and by State Attorneys General. Currently, the FCC may
seek up to $16,000 per violation. State Attorneys General, on the
other hand, are only provided with the same statutory damages
amount as private parties. Granting State Attorneys General,
whom have historically shown a willingness to bring such claims,
the ability to bring suit seeking higher damages will increase the
incentive for these state agencies to bring enforcement actions.
Increasing the number of government agencies that could
bring a cause of action under the TCPA would also result in more
effective enforcement actions. Enabling the FTC to bring enforcement actions against TCPA violators would provide the federal consumer protection agency with a broader arsenal with
which to protect consumers. The FTC is already actively involved in the areas implicated by the TCPA, and would likely
have greater success in pursuing individuals and entities that violate the FTC Act or Telemarketing Sales Rule when provided
with the broader enforcement tool of the TCPA. Since the TCPA
is more than just telemarketing regulation, and because of the increasing amount of fraud with respect to unsolicited calls and text
messages, empowering the FTC to bring suit under the TCPA
would increase the ability of the FTC to effectively protect consumers.
C. Increase Uniformity of Application

06/02/2014 15:10:17
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The TCPA has been amended and interpreted by FCC
rules and many judicial decisions over the past twenty years.
Combined with the slow FCC rulemaking process, this has resulted in inconsistent interpretations of the statute and confusion
as to the legality of certain conduct.
The TCPA would be a more effective statute if steps were
taken to increase the uniformity of its application. The Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Mims v. Arrow Financial Services,
LLC, that the TCPA provides federal question jurisdiction should
indirectly bring more uniformity in application. To the extent
that increased litigation in federal courts cannot naturally solve
the uniformity of application issues, consumers and industry
members alike would be better served by more frequent and
quickly delivered FCC interpretive rules. Lastly, rules and memoranda of understanding addressing FTC/FCC regulatory over-
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lap would provide much needed clarity to all involved parties.
1. Increased Litigation in Federal Courts Should Bring More
Uniformity
The Supreme Court in Mims v. Arrow Financial Services,
LLC, only recently addressed the issue of federal question jurisdiction over TCPA violations brought by private parties. 248 In
Mims, the Court resolved a split among the circuits regarding
whether a private party may file suit in federal court without diversity jurisdiction, or whether the TCPA granted exclusive jurisdiction to state courts. 249 The Court held that the TCPA’s grant
of jurisdiction to state courts does not deprive the federal district
courts of federal question jurisdiction over private lawsuits alleging TCPA violations. 250
Until the Court’s 9-0 decision in Mims, only the Sixth and
Seventh Circuits recognized federal question jurisdiction over
private lawsuits alleging TCPA violations. 251 The Second, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits had previously held
that district courts lacked federal question jurisdiction over private TCPA claims. 252
After the Mims decision, it can be expected that TCPA litigation will increase in federal courts (either initially filed or removed by defendants). Following the suit, several law firms stated that they expected a “flood of TCPA claims” in federal
courts. 253 In the year since more federal courts were opened to
private TCPA litigants, the number of TCPA cases filed in-
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Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 740 (2012).
Id.
250
Id.
251
Charvat v. EchoStar Satellite, LLC, 630 F. 3d 459, 463-465 (6th Cir.
2010); Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F. 3d 446, 447 (7th Cir.
2005)
252
See e.g., Foxhall Realty Law Offices, Inc. v. Telecomm’s Premium
Servs., Ltd., 156 F.3d 432, 434 (2d Cir. 1998); ErieNet, Inc. v. Velocity Net,
Inc., 156 F.3d 513, 519 (3rd Cir. 1998); Intern’tl Science & Technology Inst. v.
Inacom Comm’s, Inc., 106 F.3d 1146, 1158 (4th Cir. 1997); The Chair King,
Inc. v. Houston Cellular Corp., 131 F.3d 507, 514 (5th Cir. 1997); Murphy v.
Lanier, 204 F.3d 911, 915 (9th Cir. 2000); Mims v. Arrow Financial Services,
LLC, 421 Fed.Appx. 920, 921 (11th Cir. 2010).
253
See David N. Anthony, et al., Flood of TCPA Claims Expected in Federal
Courts,
TROUTMAN
SANDERS
LLP
(Jan.
24,
2012),
http://www.troutmansanders.com/flood-of-tcpa-claims-expected-in-federalcourts-01-24-2012/.
249
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creased by 34%. 254 However, relative to other consumer protection statutes (e.g., FDCPA 255 and FCRA 256), TCPA litigation remains a relatively low proportion of a federal court’s docket:
TCPA Litigation in Federal Court

Figure 12 257
TCPA Litigation vs. Other Consumer Protection Statutes

254
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Jack Gordon, FDCPA and Other Consumer Lawsuit Statistics, Dec 1631 & Year-End Review 2012, INTERACTIVECREDIT.COM (Jan. 16, 2012),
http://interactivecredit.com/?p=1761 (1101 cases in 2012 compared to 825 in
2011).
255
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692.
256
Fair Credit Reporting Act, § 1681 et seq.
257
WebRecon, LLC, https://www.webrecon.com/b/2012-year-end-stats/forimmediate-release-fdcpa-and-other-consumer-lawsuit-statistics-dec-16-31year-end-review-2012/.
258
WebRecon,
LLC,
https://www.webrecon.com/b/2012-year-endstats/for-immediate-release-fdcpa-and-other-consumer-lawsuit-statistics-dec-
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The result of the Mim’s decision creates a more uniform
application of the statute, if only because fewer courts are considering certain issues. However, inconsistent decisions remain within circuits on certain issues pertaining to the TCPA, which suggests that the statute will continue to suffer from interpretive
fragmentation. Greater action on behalf of the government will
help cure uniformity of application issues.
2. More FCC Rulemaking is Necessary

C M
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16-31-year-end-review-2012/.
259
Hobbs Administrative Orders Review Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 1132, reenacted as 28 U.S.C. 2341-2353 (Challenges to FCC rules and regulations are
subject to the Hobbs Administrative Orders Review Act, which deals with judicial review of agency regulations.)
260
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone and Consumer
Protection Act of 1991, C.G. Docket No. 02-278, FCC 12-143 (Nov. 26, 2012).
261
MOBILE MARKETING ASSOCIATION, U.S. CONSUMER BEST
PRACTICES, VERSION 6.1 15,
§
1.6-4
(2011),
available
at
http://mmaglobal.com/Consumer_Best%20Practices_6.1%20Update02May2011FINAL_MMA.pdf.
262
Rules & Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG Docket No. 02-278, FCC 03-153 ¶ 133 (July 3, 2003).
263
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A) (2011); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(1)(iii) (2011).
264
Rules & Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG Docket No. 02-278, FCC 03-153 ¶ 165 (July 3, 2003).

35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 37 Side A

FCC rulemaking plays a critical role in providing uniformity and clarity in implementation and interpretation of the
TCPA. 259 An FCC ruling, such as the one discussed below, can
save industry-members from the potential of inconsistent judicial
interpretations and limits judicial review to the reasonableness of
the FCC rule.
In its November 2012 Declaratory Ruling, the FCC considered the issue of whether a one-time confirmatory text message
sent to acknowledge an opt-out request was a violation under the
TCPA. 260 From a practical standpoint, a confirmatory text message – sent in response to a request to opt-out of further texts –
might be a reasonable thing to expect. Indeed, many consumers
may wish to see a confirmatory response, to know that they have
in fact been removed from the sender’s text messaging list.261
Recall that the TCPA strictly prohibits the use of auto262
dialers to make non-emergency calls without prior express consent to any cell phone. 263 The FCC has concluded that this prohibition extends to both voice and text calls. 264 Although it is
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Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone and Consumer
Protection Act of 1991, C.G. Docket No. 02-278, FCC 12-143 at 2 (Nov. 29,
2012).
266
Id. at 4.
267
Id.
268
Id. at 4 n. 31 (Confirmatory texts must: “(1) merely confirm the consumer’s opt-out request and do not include any marketing or promotional information; and (2) are the only additional message sent to the consumer after
receipt of the opt-out request.”).
269
Id.
270
Id.

35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 37 Side B

reasonable (from a consumer’s standpoint) that a confirmatory
text message would be sent in response to a request to opt-out, it
is also reasonable (from a judge’s standpoint) that the text message-sender no longer had “consent” after the consumer sent his
or her opt-out request. 265
The TCPA provided little guidance on the issue. Neither
the text of the TCPA nor its legislative history address the circumstances under which prior express consent is deemed revoked.266 With the TCPA’s statutory damages provision, different judicial interpretations could result in millions of dollars in
potential TCPA liability. With one declaratory ruling, however,
the FCC clarified the law on this matter. 267 The FCC concluded
that “one-time texts confirming a request that no further text
messages be sent does not violate the TCPA or the [FCC’s] rules
as long as the confirmation text meets specific characteristics.” 268
A single FCC decision can provide a unified, national
voice and guide to interpreting the TCPA. Here the agency was
able to issue a ruling that prevented inconsistent – although
equally reasonable – interpretations. Moreover, the FCC’s process is likely more informed than merely one federal or state court
hearing the matter. The FCC’s rulemaking process requires a
comment period in which many different interested parties (businesses and consumers alike) file their opinion to be considered. In
contrast, a court proceeding is usually limited to just the parties
involved in the particular litigation.
The importance of FCC interpretative guidance is demonstrated by the confirmatory opt-out text message case discussed
above. One issue, however, is the speed with which the FCC responds to petitions from industry members and issues declaratory
rulings like the one discussed above. For example, the original petition in the opt-out confirmatory text message case was filed on
February 16, 2012. 269 The FCC responded in late November
2012. 270 Whether this is a natural result of the rulemaking process
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3. Clearer Rules and Memoranda of Understanding Could Help
Reduce Confusion from Regulatory Overlap
Although both the CAN-SPAM Act and the TCPA primarily regulate the use of technology to send unsolicited messages, the two statutes have generally been confined to different me271
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Charvat v. EchoStar Satellite, LLC, 630 F.3d 459, 466 (6th Cir. 2010)
(“[a]lthough a decision by the FCC would not guarantee nationwide uniformity, it would narrow the scope of judicial inquiry to whether the agency reasonably interpreted the statute.”).
272
Id. at 459.
273
Id. at 466.
274
As opposed to thousands of state courts, TCPA lawsuits are now more
likely to be filed in, or removed to, federal courts.

35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 38 Side A

due to the amount of the research required or number of interested parties involved is not immediately clear.
The TCPA’s effectiveness depends on the FCC continuing
to timely deliver these types of declaratory rulings. This is especially true as the statute is interpreted to address new forms of
technology. FCC interpretations reduce the likelihood of inconsistent judicial interpretations – as the focus of judicial inquiry on
the topic would be on the reasonableness of the FCC’s interpretation. 271 A continued FCC presence through declaratory rulings
and interpretations would serve both consumers and industry
members well.
Uniform regulation is necessary to provide industry members with a clear understanding of what practices are legally
permitted. For instance, the Sixth Circuit in Charvat v. EchoStar
Satellite, 272 noted that “[t]elemarketers generally peddle their services nationally [which creates] the possibility of conflicting decisions in different state and federal jurisdictions.” 273 Similarly,
debt collection agencies’ business often spans multiple jurisdictions. Consequently, inconsistent judicial interpretations – a natural result of the many different jurisdictions considering TCPA
lawsuits – leaves industry members exposed to unclear regulation.
There is reason to be optimistic that the TCPA will become more uniformly interpreted as the statute is litigated more
frequently in federal courts rather than state courts. 274 However,
there is no guarantee. As the TCPA expands to cover new technologies, reasonable differences of opinion will surface, and the
FCC must be present more often to issue guidance.
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dia (e-mail for CAN-SPAM, and telephones and fax machines for
the TCPA). However, new technology has resulted in an overlap:
internet-to-cell phone text messages implicate both the TCPA and
CAN-SPAM. 275
Internet-to-cell phone text messages work as follows: every
cell-phone number has an e-mail address, which is typically that
user’s cell phone number with their wireless carrier’s Internet
address. 276 For example, a cell phone user that subscribed to
AT&T with the number (123) 456-7890 would have the following
e-mail address 1234567890@att.wireless.net. 277 Anyone may write
an e-mail to that address, which the wireless carrier then converts
into a text message. The message is then sent directly to a person’s cell phone as a text message. 278
CAN-SPAM reaches text messages if “the messages use an
Internet address that includes an Internet domain name.”279 Specifically, under CAN-SPAM, the FCC has the power to regulate
mobile service commercial messages (MSCMs), which are defined
as “a commercial electronic mail message that is transmitted directly to a wireless device that is utilized by a subscriber of commercial mobile service . . . in connection with such service.” 280
With respect to the TCPA, text messages are considered a “call”
for which the called party is charged. As a result, if the text message is sent by an “automatic telephone dialing system,” 281 or
without consent of the recipient, it is illegal under the TCPA.
Under the CAN-SPAM Act, both the FTC and the FCC
regulate certain text messages. Examining the FTC’s rules, the
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275
CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7712 (2006) (Section 14 of the CANSPAM Act explicitly states that the Act does not preempt the TCPA.).
276
Gareth S. Lacy, Mobile Marketing Derailed: How Curbing Cell-Phone
Spam in Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster May Have Banned Text-Message
Advertising, 6 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 33, 36 (2010).
277
Joffe v. Acacia Mortgage Co., 121 P.3d 831, 837-38 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2005); See also Gareth S. Lacy, Mobile Marketing Derailed: How Curbing CellPhone Spam in Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster May Have Banned TextMessage Advertising, 6 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 33, 36 (2010).
278
Joffe, 121 P.3d at 837-38 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005); See also, Gareth S.
Lacy, Mobile Marketing Derailed: How Curbing Cell-Phone Spam in Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster May Have Banned Text-Message Advertising, 6
WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 33, 36 (2010).
279
15 U.S.C. §7712.
280
Id.
281
47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) (2011) (“The term ‘automatic telephone dialing
system’ means equipment which has the capacity—(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator;
and (B) to dial such numbers.”).
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285

16 C.F.R. § 316.
47 C.F.R. § 64.3100.
Joffe v. Acacia Mortgage Corp., 121 P.3d 831 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
Id. at 833.
Id. at 833.
Id. at 838.
Id. at 840.

35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 39 Side A

focus is placed on identification requirements. For example, under the FTC’s CAN-SPAM Act rules all marketing messages
must identify the sender and must include an opt-out mechanism. 282 In contrast to the FTC’s rules, the FCC rules require the
sender to have the consent of the recipient. Although the FCC also requires the sender to provide identification, under FCC rule
the message must clearly identify the sender so that the recipient
can reasonably determine that the sender indeed has obtained the
recipient’s consent. 283
Joffe v. Acacia Mortgage Corp. sought to sort out the overlapping statutes. 284 The defendant, Acacia, had programmed its
computers to send e-mail advertisements to consumer e-mail addresses. 285 In the plaintiff’s case, Acacia’s computers generated
his cell phone number, “(602)XXX-XXXX,” plus his cell phone
carrier’s domain name, “att.net,” and sent the solicitations to the
e-mail address 602XXXXXXX@att.net. AT&T then converted
the e-mails into text messages, which the plaintiff received on his
phone.
Acacia argued that the TCPA did not apply because they
had merely sent an e-mail to the plaintiff, and e-mails are covered
by CAN-SPAM and not the TCPA. 286 Disagreeing with Acacia’s
reasoning, the court held that “[w]hether a text message is sent
phone-to-phone or Internet-to-phone, the end result is the same.
The recipient’s cellular telephone carrier forwards what is an
SMS message to the recipient’s cellular telephone.” 287 The court
then held, “Acacia took advantage of Internet-to-phone SMS
technology – technology that guaranteed its computer generated
text messages would be delivered to [the plaintiff’s] cellular telephone. By pairing its computers with SMS technology, Acacia did
what the TCPA prohibits. It used an automatic telephone dialing
system to call a telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone.” 288
The court then considered the TCPA’s interaction with
the CAN-SPAM Act. The court found that Congress believed
that the “CAN-SPAM Act and the TCPA would have ‘dual-
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Id.
Id. at 841 (citing Rules and Regulations Implementing the CANSPAM Act of 2003 and the TCPA, 19 FCC Rcd. 15927, 15933, § 16, 2004 WL
1794922 (2004)).
291
Id.
292
FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR FY 2003
AND 2004 PURSUANT TO THE DO NOT CALL IMPLEMENTATION ACT ON
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL DO NOT CALL REGISTRY app. (Sept.
2005),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/national-do-not-callregistry-annual-report-congress-fy-2003-and-fy-2004-pursuant-do-notcall/051004dncfy0304.pdf (FCC – FTC Memorandum of Understanding: Telemarketing Enforcement (Dec. 2003)).
290
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applicability.’” 289 The court acknowledged that the FCC had decided to regulate Internet-to-phone SMS messages under § 14 of
the CAN-SPAM Act because they are initially directed to an address that contains an Internet domain reference. 290 However, this
decision did not preempt the applicability of the TCPA to Internet-to-phone text messages. Moreover, “[a]pplication of the
TCPA to Internet-to-phone SMS messages does not render the
CAN-SPAM Act’s regulation of such messages superfluous” because the CAN-SPAM Act is “broader than the TCPA.” The
court noted, “[t]he CAN-SPAM Act applies to all uninvited
MSCMs. In contrast, the TCPA applies to only those calls made
using an automated dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded
voice.” 291
The FCC has issued rules in the past that make it clear
that the use of certain technology is prohibited regardless of the
content being delivered. In the above case, Acacia may have believed that sending e-mails (even though they ultimately became
text messages) was legal. A clear rule issued by the FCC that
states a text message received by a recipient is subject to the
TCPA, no matter the manner in which it is sent, would clearly establish the bounds within which an industry member could operate.
The overlap between FTC and FCC rule should be addressed by the two agencies. The FTC and FCC have published
memoranda of understanding in the past concerning regulatory
and enforcement efforts. 292 A clear memorandum explaining the
FTC and FCC’s positions on the application of CAN-SPAM and
the TCPA to new technology would better serve both consumers
and businesses alike.
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D. Amending the TCPA
In addition to more effective FCC rulemaking and an expanded role for the FTC, statutory amendments are necessary to
address new and changing technology. The following addresses
existing proposed amendments and new potential amendments
that would clarify and strengthen TCPA regulation of new and
existing technologies.
1. Protect Cell Phones: No Exceptions to Ban
Congress debated legislation in late 2010 and 2011 that
would have limited the protections afforded to consumers’ cell
phones. Had The Mobile Informational Call Act of 2011 (MICA)
been enacted, it would have amended the TCPA to “permit informational calls to mobile telephone numbers.” The bill’s sponsor, Congressman Lee Terry, explained that the bill was designed
to “[p]rovide consumers with important information in a timely
manner” and “would modernize the TCPA by:
Exempting informational calls from the restriction on auto-dialer and artificial/prerecorded
voice calls to wireless numbers;

x

Clarifying the “prior express consent” requirement to ensure that the TCPA facilitates communications between consumers and the businesses with which they choose to interact; and

x

Continuing the prohibition against the use of assistive technologies to make telemarketing calls
to wireless numbers.” 293

Congressman Terry stated “[u]nfortunately, the [TCPA]
restricts informational calls to mobile devices. With approximately 40% of consumers relying on wireless phones as their primary
or exclusive communications device, the TCPA’s outdated restriction on the use of assistive technologies in contacting wireless
consumers for non-telemarketing purposes is now doing far more
harm than good.” 294
Press Release, U.S. Congressman Lee Terry, The Mobile Informational
Call
Act
of
2011
(Oct.
11,
2011),
available
at
http://leeterry.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=359628.
294
Id.
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A letter sent to Congress signed by 54 Attorneys General
outlined the danger of robocalls to cell phones as a result of the
“inevitable increase in calls to wireless phones.” 295 Although the
legislation did not pass, it is important to acknowledge the ongoing efforts to change the TCPA, and the impact amendments
would have on the statute.
The TCPA is more than just telemarketing regulation; it is
an important consumer protection statute. Opening cell phones to
more calls through an EBR or similar exemption would drastically increase the amount of calls a consumer could receive. MICA,
and legislation like it, should not be enacted. The heightened
cost-shifting, privacy, and safety concerns for cell phones justify a
continued strict consent scheme with respect to such communications.
2. Protect Cell Phones: Prior Express Consent Required
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Y K
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295
Letter from the National Association of Attorneys General to Congress
(Dec.
7,
2011),
available
at
http://signon.s3.amazonaws.com/20111207.signon.Final_HR3035_Letter.pdf
(citing distraction.gov; 2009 study by the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration indicated that cell phone use was involved in 995 fatalities (or
18%) in distraction-related accidents).
296
GroupMe, Inc., Petition for Expedited Declaratory Ruling and Clarification, CG Docket No. 02-278 (filed Mar. 1, 2012), available at
http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7021871907.
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The FCC should require prior, express written consent for
any commercial message received as a text message by a recipient. Various techniques have been proposed to regulate telemarketing technology. Company-specific opt-out schemes have proven inefficient when applied to both junk faxes and telemarketing
regulation and should not be applied to text messages. The consumer would still bear the cost of the initial unwanted text message and would have to contact each company to opt-out. Thus,
an EBR or other exception to a pure consent-based scheme for
text messaging is inappropriate.
There is currently an FCC petition seeking to allow third
parties to provide the consent required for sending an unsolicited
text message to a recipient. 296 Allowing consent to be given by a
third party is not true consent, and would lead to significant consumer confusion. Consumers should not be exposed to a potential
flood of unwanted text messages that might legally be sent
through “consent” derived through a business relationship (i.e., a
text message EBR) or from a third party. The FCC and Congress
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must keep a strict, opt-in consent based scheme for the regulation
of text messages.
3. Increasing Clarity: Placing a Time Limit on the Junk Fax
EBR
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297
68 Fed. Reg. 4594 (Jan. 29, 2003); see also 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(5)(ii)
(2011) (the FCC’s rules provide: an “established business relationship with a
particular business entity does not extend to affiliated entities unless the [consumer] would reasonably expect them to be included”).
298
149 CONG. REC. S11957, 11964 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2003) (statement of
Sen. Dodd) (emphasis added).
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A time limit on the junk fax EBR would be a simple and
practical improvement. In considering whether a company has an
EBR with a consumer, the FTC characterizes the issue as follows: “would consumers likely be surprised by that call and find
it inconsistent with having placed their telephone number on the
national ‘do-not-call registry’?” 297 The same principle may generally be sought with respect to a junk fax EBR time limit: “after a
certain period of time, would the consumer be surprised to receive an unsolicited fax advertisement from this entity?” The answer would almost assuredly be that the consumer does not expect to receive an unsolicited advertisement after over a year has
passed since the EBR was formed (without additional facts showing that there is a continued relationship during that time).
While this would require an increased amount of record
keeping by businesses, those wishing to send an unsolicited fax
pursuant to an EBR must already be able to establish that an
EBR exists in the event of a challenge brought by a consumer.
Recognizing the ease in which an EBR may be created, Senator
Dodd remarked, “[t]here are going to be people coming back,
once they discover that any prior business relationship pretty
much will allow the exception to occur . . . [that] are going to be
asking us to come back and even close the loophole down further.” 298 By placing a one-year time limit on the junk fax EBR,
this loophole is closed, but does not place that great of a burden
on an entity that was required to prove the existence of an EBR
in the first place.
Some may advocate completely removing the junk fax
EBR. However, this would come at a great cost to entities that
send unsolicited advertisements pursuant to the EBR with little
actual impact on the tide of the current problems facing the
TCPA. The EBR is not the greatest source of the junk fax prob-
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lem. Current lawsuits indicate that those violating the TCPA are
either unaware of the TCPA (and thus would not know of the
EBR) or are intentionally violating the TCPA. As a result, completely removing the EBR may not have that great of a practical
effect on increasing compliance.
A time limit placed on the junk fax EBR, based on the DoNot-Call Registry’s EBR, would reduce both consumer confusion
and unwanted fax advertisements, and would do so without a
significant burden on industry members. The time limit imposed
should recognize that an EBR would last longer where the consumer-recipient has taken a more active step in communicating
with the sender. Accordingly, the following should be adopted for
the junk fax EBR:
The Junk Fax EBR should be limited to the following in
instances where the recipient “(i) purchased, rented, or leased
goods or services from the seller or entered into a financial transaction with the seller within the eighteen months immediately
preceding the date of the telemarketing call; or (ii) made an “inquiry or application regarding a product or service offered by the
seller, within the three months immediately preceding the date of
a telemarketing call.” 299
4. Increase Effectiveness: Targeting Junk Fax Broadcasters

299

Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B)(ii) (2010).
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 7 F.C.C. Rcd. 8752, 8779; see also Taylor v. XRG, Inc., 2007
WL 1816142 (Ct. of App. Ohio June 21, 2007).
301
Rules & Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 68 Fed. Reg. 41,144, 44,169 (July 25, 2003).
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The immense amount of junk faxes that have been sent
over the past twenty or more years is due largely in part to “fax
blasters,” third parties that send faxes to consumers on behalf of
others. The FCC originally concluded that common carriers
simply providing transmission facilities to transmit fax advertisements would not be held liable in the absence of a high degree
of involvement or actual notice of illegal use of its system. 300 In
2003, the FCC amended its rules “to state explicitly that a fax
broadcaster will be liable for an unsolicited fax [only] if there is a
high degree of involvement or actual notice on the part of the
broadcaster.” 301
Common carriers would only be subject to liability under
similar circumstances of involvement or actual notice of illegal

300
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activity. 302 The FCC concluded that “if a common carrier is merely providing the network over which a subscriber [for example, a
fax broadcaster or other individual, business, or entity] sends an
unsolicited facsimile message, that common carrier will not be liable.” 303 Consistent with previous interpretations, the FCC clarified the definition of “sender” to mean the person or entity on
whose behalf the fax is transmitted or whose goods or services are
advertised or promoted. 304
In Protus IP Solutions, Inc., the defendant allegedly sent
unsolicited facsimile advertisements to plaintiffs over its “fax
transmission system.” 305 The defendant argued that because it
was “merely a ‘fax broadcaster’ and not a true ‘sender’ of the
faxes in question,” it could not be held liable for any of the faxes
allegedly sent to plaintiffs. 306 In response, the plaintiffs pointed to
the text of the TCPA: it is “unlawful for any person . . . to use any
telephone or facsimile machine . . . to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement.” 307 The plaintiffs argued that “because the faxes at issue were technically sent
through [the defendant’s] faxing software, [the defendant] is the
true sender and is necessarily liable for any unwanted faxes sent
over its system.” 308 On plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment,
the court held that the defendant met the definition of “fax
broadcaster” under the FCC’s regulations. 309
In Texas v. American Blastfax, Inc., 310 the court rejected
the defendant’s argument that the “fax broadcaster exception”
302
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Taylor v. XRG, Inc., No. 06AP-839, 2007 WL 1816142 (Ohio Ct. App.
June 21, 2007).
303
Rules & Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 68 Fed. Reg. 41,144, 44,169 (July 25, 2003); see Kaufman v.
ACS Systems, Inc., 110 Cal.App.4th 886, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 296 (2003); see also
Taylor v. XRG, Inc., No. 06AP-839, 2007 WL 1816142 (Ohio Ct. App. June
21, 2007).
304
Taylor v. XRG, Inc., No. 06AP-839, 2007 WL 1816142 (Ohio Ct. App.
June 21, 2007) (citing 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(8)); Covington & Burling v. Internatl. Marketing & Research, Inc., No. CIV.A. 01-0004360, 2003 WL 21384825
(D.C. Super. Ct. 2004) (imposing liability on the sender of faxes as well as the
companies whose products were advertised).
305
Pasco v. Protus IP Solutions, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 2d 825, 831 (D. Md.
2011).
306
Id. at 840.
307
Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (2011) (emphasis added).
308
Id.
309
Id. at 841.
310
Texas v. American Blastfax, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (W.D. Tex.
2000).
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applied. The court concluded that because the company’s “business center[ed] around using a fax machine to send unsolicited
advertisements—the precise conduct outlawed by the TCPA,” the
company “[wa]s more than a common carrier or service provider
[because it] maintain[ed] and use[d] a database of recipient fax
numbers, actively solicit[ed] third party advertisers and presumably review[ed] the content of the fax advertisements it sen[t].” 311
Therefore, the court held that the defendant was “more than a
mere conduit for third party faxes.” 312
Targeting the cause of junk faxes, the TCPA places regulations on the creators of the junk fax content, which is similar to
the regulations placed on “sellers” in telemarketing regulation.
Fax broadcasters are the “source” of the junk faxes and are currently presented with very little incentive to determine whether
the faxes they are sending are legal under the TCPA. In fact, fax
broadcasters have every reason to remain willfully ignorant of the
status of the faxes being sent because the higher degree of involvement that a fax broadcaster has with its client’s faxes, the
more likely it will be subject to TCPA liability.
The TCPA would be a more effective statute by increasing
regulations on fax broadcasting companies. Holding fax broadcasters liable where it is obvious that their client does not possess
an EBR with the large list of numbers will increase compliance. 313 The TCPA would be a more effective statute in this
sense, and it would mirror CAN-SPAM’s prohibitions on e-mail
harvesting.

The private right of action and the statutory damages
provision of the TCPA receive the largest amount of criticism. In
interviews with practitioners, many supported either an effort to
remove the statutory damages provision or efforts to cap TCPA
liability at a preset amount. Indeed, while one side laments the
“cottage industry” of TCPA litigation that has arisen in recent
years 314 and advocates a more balanced approach to junk fax
311

Id. at 1089-90.
Id.
313
For instance, where the company is a new company, but provides a list
of telephone numbers that it would be impossible for a new company to have
created EBRs with in such a short time.
314
Brandee L. Caswell, Regulating Faxing Activity Under State and Fed-
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5. Responding to Criticism: Preserving Private Right of Action
and Statutory Damages Provision
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regulation, 315 the other side bemoans Congress’ decision to “overlook well-established consumer protection policies of privacy and
cost-shifting” by amending the TCPA with the JFPA in 2005. 316
A TCPA plaintiff does not need to prove receipt of a junk
fax in order to have an actionable claim. Many claim that the
TCPA represents “too strong of a hammer” given the ease in
demonstrating a violation and the potential for large damages,
and the relatively small amount of actual harm suffered by those
receiving a fax advertisement or unwanted phone call. 317 Despite
its impact in reducing intrusive practices, critics even find support amongst some members of the judiciary. One court commented, “[i]n 1991, with a conspicuous lack of foresight for the
impact that it would ultimately have on courts – particularly
courts of limited jurisdiction like our Small Claims Branch –
Congress passed the Telephone Consumer Protection Act . . . .” 318
Most of the criticism is levied on the impact of the class action mechanism in TCPA litigation. In fact, two authors commenting on one TCPA lawsuit remarked, “What started out as a
one-page fax offering discount burgers and beer became a nightmare of eight-figure proportions.” 319 One court has noted:
Ostensibly, TCPA’s purpose is to protect the individual
telephone consumer by discouraging and preventing
those annoying telephone calls which come in the middle of dinner, prerecorded sales pitches which fill an en-
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eral Law, 34 COLO. LAW. 63 (Dec. 2005).
315
See e.g., Yuri R. Linetsky, Protection of “Innocent Lawbreakers”:
Striking the Right Balance in the Private Enforcement of the Anti- “Junk Fax”
Provisions of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 90 NEB. L. Rev. 70, 91,
n. 133 (2011); Michael R. Laudino, To Fax or Not to Fax: Analysis of the Regulations and Potential Burdens Imposed by the Junk Fax Prevention Act of
2005, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 835, 859 (2007).
316
Jennifer A. Williams, Faxing It In, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 345, 383 (2006).
317
See Brandee L. Caswell, Regulating Faxing Activity Under State and
Federal Law, 34 COLO. LAW. 63 (Dec. 2005); see also Yuri R. Linetsky, Protection of “Innocent Lawbreakers”: Striking the Right Balance in the Private Enforcement of the Anti- “Junk Fax” Provisions of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 90 NEB. L. Rev. 70, 91, n. 133 (2011).
318
William Adler, et al. v. Imak Wireless, Inc., No. 14719-01 (D.C. Super.
Ct.
2007),
available
at
http://www.groklaw.net/articlebasic.php?story=20071111092540787.
319
Michael J. Rust and Pamela S. Webb, The Unsettling Fax About Coverage Claims Under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 35 BRIEF 13
(Winter 2006) (discussing Hooters of Augusta, Inc. v. Nicholson, 537 S.E. 2d
468, 245 (Ga. App. 2000)).
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tire answering machine tape, and unsolicited faxes
which waste time, paper and ink . . . . However, in a
classic case of the best laid plans going awry, enterprising attorneys have gleaned, from the seemingly harmless
packaging of consumer protection, a potent class-action
weapon. 320
Arguments concerning class actions are not unique to the
TCPA. A significant amount of case law has been devoted to the
relative appropriateness of TCPA class actions.
Courts have declined to certify a class action in TCPA
causes of action for several different reasons. However, it appears
that only one court has determined that class actions are virtually
per se inappropriate for TCPA violations. In Forman v. Data
Transfer, Inc., 321 the court held that “[a] class action would be inconsistent with the specific and personal remedy provided by
Congress to address the minor nuisance of unsolicited facsimile
advertisements.” 322 In so noting, the Forman court cited the decision in Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 323 which
“den[ied] class certification where the Truth in Lending Act’s
minimum award of $100 each for some 130,000 class members
would be an ‘horrendous, possibly annihilating punishment,’ unrelated to any damage to the purported class or to any benefit to
defendant.” 324
The Forman court’s citation of Ratner seems to suggest
that the Forman court refused to allow TCPA class actions based
upon the prospective of a large award of damages. 325 Neverthe-
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320
Joseph N. Main P.C. v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 168 F.R.D. 573, 575
(N.D. Tex. 1996).
321
Forman v. Data Transfer, Inc., 164 F.R.D. 400 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
322
Id. at 405 (citing Ratner v. Chem. Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412,
416 (S.D. N.Y. 1972) (class certification denied where the Truth in Lending
Act’s minimum award of $100 each for about 130,000 class members would be
a “horrendous, possibly annihilating punishment, unrelated to any damage to
the purported class or to any benefit to defendant.”).
323
Ratner, 54 F.R.D. at 416.
324
Forman, 164 F.R.D. at 405 (citing Ratner, 54 F.R.D. at 416) (class certification denied where the Truth in Lending Act’s minimum award of $100
each for about 130,000 class members would be a “horrendous, possibly annihilating punishment, unrelated to any damage to the purported class or to any
benefit to defendant.”).
325
Interestingly, after the decision in Ratner, Congress amended TILA by
expressly authorizing class action and limiting the permissible aggregate recovery in a class action to the lesser of $100,000 or 1 percent of the net worth of
the class action defendant found in violation of TILA. See Agostine v. Sidcon
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less, the Forman court’s focus on the “specific and personal remedy” of the TCPA indicates that the court was concerned with
whether class actions were part of the original statutory scheme.
A New Jersey state court held “[i]t would be manifestly unjust to
subject [the defendant] to a $23,000,000 judgment (including attorney’s fees) for damages to an entire class of plaintiffs when
Congress intended damages of $500 to be pursued by individual
plaintiffs.” 326 Similarly, the court in Cellco P’ship held that “[t]he
scale of the damages sought by Plaintiffs in this action further indicates that Plaintiffs do not fall into the zone of interests of the
TCPA. 327 The TCPA [. . .] anticipates damages on an individual
basis because the contemplated plaintiff is an individual natural
person or business with a limited number of phone lines on which
it might receive telemarketing calls. Congress contemplated that
TCPA plaintiffs would bring claims in small claims court without
the aid of an attorney.” 328
Other courts have responded differently as to whether allowing class actions for TCPA violations would be inconsistent
with Congress’ original intent. In Kaufman v. ACS Sys., Inc., 329 a
California state court held “[a] class action in superior court
would fulfill Senator Hollings’s expectations. A class action, like
a dispute in small claims court, would provide ‘small claimants’
with proper redress.”330 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit held “violations of § 227(b)(1)(C) of the TCPA are not per se unsuitable for
class resolution but, as these cases also illustrate, there are no invariable rules regarding the suitability of a particular case filed
under this subsection of the TCPA for class treatment; the unique
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Corp., 69 F.R.D. 437, 444 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (“The amendment represents a legislative response to those judicial decisions denying class action certification in
Truth in Lending cases [. . .] At the same time, it places an aggregate limitation
of the lesser of $100,000 or 1 per centum of a creditor’s net worth on a creditor’s class action liability, not involving actual damages, thus avoiding the
‘annihilating punishment’ that could be caused by a damage award of at least
$100 per class member. See, Ratner v. Chem. Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D.
412, 416 (S.D.N.Y.1972).”)(internal citations omitted) Today, TILA limits the
permissible aggregate recovery in a class action to the lesser of “$500,000 or 1
per centum of the net worth of the creditor.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 1640(a)(2)(B).
326
Freedman v. Advanced Wireless Cellular Commc’ns, No. SOM–L–
611–02, 2005 WL 2122304 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 24, 2005).
327
Cellco P’ship v. Wilcrest Health Care Mgmt., No. 09-3534 (MLC),
2012 WL 1638056 (D.N.J. May 8, 2012).
328
Id.
329
Kaufman v. ACS Sys., Inc., 110 Cal. App. 4th 886, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 296
(2003).
330
Id. at 924.
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331

Gene and Gene LLC v. Biopay LLC, 541 F. 3d 318, 328 (5th Cir. 2008).
Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.
333
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692.
334
Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.
335
Baltimore-Washington Tel. Co. v. Hot Leads Co., LLC, 584 F. Supp.
2d 736, 740 (D. Md. 2008).
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facts of each case generally will determine whether certification is
proper.” 331
The TCPA combines strict liability, statutory damages,
and the class action mechanism to provide a high level of consumer protection and incentive for consumers to prosecute violations. Removing or reducing the level of damages or the ability to
bring a class action would be detrimental to the statute. The prospect of a large class action suit provides a significant deterrent,
especially given the FCC’s limited enforcement efforts. Class actions also bring attention to the TCPA and the illegality of certain
conduct. Increased attention to the statute increases compliance
by industry members and increases awareness by consumers,
which is important where enforcement efforts rely so heavily on
consumers reporting violations.
On the other hand, increasing the statutory damages
amount would be inappropriate. The amount of damages already
serves as a significant deterrent, and there is no reason to believe
that increasing the damages would increase this effect. Moreover,
given the increasing amount of intentional violators of the TCPA,
increasing the statutory damages amount would likely have little
effect.
Finally, with respect to TCPA damages, some attorneys
have advocated for a fee-shifting provision. Unlike other consumer protection statutes such as the Truth in Lending Act, 332 the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 333 and the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 334 the TCPA does not contain a fee-shifting provision.
Numerous individuals interviewed during the course of this report advocated that such a provision would increase the effectiveness of the TCPA. Attorney’s fees have been awarded where
the plaintiff has successfully alleged violations of a state TCPA
counterpart. For instance, the court in Hot Leads, considered attorney’s fees in the context of the Maryland TCPA, which provides (1) a person may not violate the federal TCPA, (2) statutory
damages of $500 per violation, and (3) reasonable attorney’s
fees. 335 Similarly, in Jemiola the court awarded the plaintiff damages in the amount $9,000 for violations of the TCPA, $1,200 for

332
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violations of the Ohio CSPA, and $7,250 in attorney’s fees. 336
Data suggests that fee-shifting provisions do not provide a
significant incentive to bring a TCPA case. 337 Moreover, feeshifting provisions do not seem to provide a significant increase
in compliance with the TCPA, which is the main goal of this report’s recommendations. It appears that fee-shifting provisions
have more of an impact on regulating attorney conduct during litigation than actually preventing the initial violation. Preserving
the availability of class actions appears more than an adequate
substitute for new fee shifting provisions.
6. Responding to New Practices: Caller ID Manipulation

336
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Jemiola v. XYZ Corp., 126 Ohio Misc. 2d 68, 2003-Ohio-7321, 802
N.E.2d 745, at ¶ 33.
337
Arguably, the potential TCPA plaintiff already has a large enough incentive to bring a case given the relative ease of establishing most TCPA violations and the low actual harm suffered by a TCPA plaintiff.
338
See Lauren Silverman, FTC Offers $50,000 Reward to Help Stop Robocalls, NPR (Jan. 02, 2013), www.npr.org/2013/01/02/168444025/rewardoffered-to-help-stop-robocalls (“These are not like the calls we grew up
with . . . They are computer-blasted calls that are enabled by the Internet. The
dialers are outside the U.S. generally, and these dialers are capable of blasting
out an unfathomable number of telephone calls.”).
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Tracking TCPA violators has become increasingly difficult. Many companies that are knowingly violating the TCPA
will operate off-shore and are essentially judgment proof. 338 Furthermore, some entities manipulate their caller ID. While there
are legitimate reasons for manipulating caller ID, consumers
would be better served by increased regulation.
One suggestion for tracking these entities is the mandatory
logging and posting of bonds, which will increase the likelihood
that an entity will be identified. Such a requirement would be
levied on the carriers that wish to permit customers to manipulate
their outbound caller ID. The regulation would require such carriers to collect a significant bond from each such customer. Legitimate companies should have no burden posting a bond. Companies that are planning to flout the TCPA would be deterred from
doing so for two reasons: (1) initial start-up costs are much higher;
and (2) the entity will lose the bond if it is determined that it is violating the TCPA.
Increasing logging requirements for those carriers that allow entities to manipulate caller ID would also improve the ability to track TCPA violators. These requirements would increase
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the probability that a violator is located. Carriers could also be
required to verify that any manipulated caller ID is actually a
registered phone number.
During an interview conducted for this report, an example
of requiring a bond for those that wish to manipulate their caller
ID was likened to metal recyclers. Metal recyclers are confronted
with individuals that are stealing copper and selling it as scrap.
As a result, in many instances those metal recyclers require identification from the scrapper—to later track that person in case the
metal was stolen. Those metal recyclers that choose not to do
business with entities that are violating the law have no need to
worry. Likewise, a carrier that does not allow an entity to manipulate its caller ID would incur no extra cost of this increased
regulation. Regulating entities that enable caller ID manipulation
provides a “chokepoint” in which illegal conduct may be cut-off
and deterred. Amending the TCPA to implement this bond requirement would improve compliance with the statute.

CONCLUSION

Increase government enforcement of the TCPA
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The TCPA has remained relevant for over twenty years
due to the basic premise for which it was enacted – to protect
consumers from the ever-increasing access made possible by
technology – and remains pertinent in modern times. Through
the implementation of the Do-Not-Call Registry and periods of
stepped-up government enforcement, the statute has curbed the
abuses of robocalls and unsolicited fax advertisements.
Going forward, the TCPA will be defined by its ability to
protect consumers’ cell phones. Whether the potential abuse is in
the form of a robocall to a consumer’s cell phone, or a text message sent with fraudulent intent, the need for the TCPA is clear.
The TCPA is designed to limit privacy intrusions, protect consumers, and prevent cost-shifting advertising. These fundamental
purposes remain a strong basis to support continued enforcement
of the statute as applied to both older technology (e.g., fax machines, residential lines) and newer forms of technology (e.g., cell
phones).
Several amendments and modifications should be made to
the TCPA and the agencies tasked with its enforcement and interpretation. In order for the TCPA to continue to remain relevant going forward, this report recommends:
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by providing State Attorneys General with a
larger incentive to bring TCPA cases, and empowering the FTC to bring suit under the TCPA;
x

Increase uniformity of application of the TCPA
by encouraging more frequent and quicker FCC
rulemaking procedures;

x

Continue to protect cell phones by requiring prior express consent for any communication (call
or text) made to a cell phone;

x

Place a time limit on the Junk Fax Established
Business Relationship;

x

Create incentives for fax broadcasting companies
to determine whether the faxes they are sending
on behalf of clients are in violation of the TCPA;

x

Rebuff efforts to remove or otherwise modify the
private right of action; and

x

Place additional restrictions on entities that enable caller ID manipulation.
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339
Critchfield Physical Therapy v. Taranto Grp., Inc., 263 P.3d 767, 774
(Kan. 2011).
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By expanding the number of agencies responsible for the
statute’s enforcement, along with increasing the incentive to
bring TCPA claims, increased enforcement should lead to increased compliance. By providing more frequent and comprehensive interpretations of the statute, the FCC can remove the necessity to resort to the courts to sort out gaps in the legislation as
applied to newer technology. Properly updated, the TCPA can
still play a vital role against the “ever-increasing access through
electronic means” that companies have to consumers. 339

